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Despite ever-growing interest in the ‘social brain’ and the search for the neural 
underpinnings of social cognition, we are yet to fully understand the basic neurocognitive 
mechanisms underlying complex social behaviours and their development. One such 
candidate mechanism is the control of neural representations of the self and of other people 
(Brass, Ruby, & Spengler, 2009; Spengler, von Cramon, & Brass, 2009a). For example, when 
taking another’s perspective or controlling the tendency to imitate another’s actions, key 
milestones in social cognitive development, it is necessary to control or switch between one’s 
own self-generated representations, and representations elicited by others. Moreover, if a 
common, underlying neurocognitive mechanism to explain performance across social 
domains is found, this may shed important light on our understanding of disorders 
accompanied by broad social impairments. This thesis will take three main foci in its 
investigation of self-other control as a candidate neurocognitive mechanism of typical and 
atypical social cognition. Firstly, the thesis will provide an examination of behavioural 
indexes of self-other control using experimental tasks. Secondly, a potential neural basis for 
such a mechanism will be investigated using neurostimulation. Thirdly, it will be investigated 
whether disorders of social cognition, in particular autism, may involve atypical modulation 
of self and other representations (Cook & Bird, 2012; Sowden & Shah, 2014) and thus may 
be characterised as ‘disorders of self-other control’ or top-down modulation of social 
behaviour. Using the findings from this thesis, discussion will be introduced about the 
potential for training such a mechanism in order to achieve across-domain amelioration of 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Humans are uniquely social beings and crave the company of, and interaction with, their 
conspecifics (Adolphs, 2003). Social cognition refers to the cognitive processes involved in 
such social behaviour; how one is able to make sense of the social world, including attending 
to, perceiving, interpreting and responding to the actions, beliefs, desires, intentions and 
emotions of both the self and of others (Moskowitz, 2005). The proliferation of interest in 
this area of research has revealed the cognitive and neural underpinnings of key milestones in 
social cognitive development, as well as beginning to shed light on both the aetiology and 
consequences of atypical social cognition (Blakemore, Winston, & Frith, 2004). Identifying 
commonalities in the mechanisms recruited across various domains of social cognition is 
important here, and may provide an understanding not only of typical social cognitive 
function but also what happens when these mechanisms go awry. This thesis aims to 
investigate the possibility of a common, underlying neurocognitive mechanism for social 
cognition; how this may help to explain performance across social domains, as well as 
providing a framework for understanding the broad-reaching social impairments observed in 
developmental and clinical disorders such as autism and schizophrenia. A candidate process 
here is the ability to represent and switch between neural representations pertaining to both 
the self and to other people. Let us first consider some key areas of social cognition in which 
shared representations of the self and the other are fundamental. 
1.1.  Shared Representations 
1.1.1.  Imitation.  A fundamental aspect of social interaction is our ability to mirror 
or imitate the actions of others, described as the ‘social glue’ (Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng, & 
Chartrand, 2003) required to create and maintain successful relationships with others. This 
has been highlighted in the field of social psychology, with classic observation studies 
13 
revealing a ‘chameleon effect’ where individuals unconsciously mimic the gestures and 
postures of those with whom they interact (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Chartrand, Cheng, & 
Jefferis, 2002).  
Cognitive neuroscientists have sought a neural basis for such automatic imitation of 
others’ behaviour and proposed that it may rely on the human mirror neuron system (MNS). 
First discovered in monkeys (di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992; 
Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004) and subsequently in humans (Molenberghs, Cunnington, & 
Mattingley, 2012), the MNS comprises regions in the premotor and parietal cortices of the 
brain which respond both during the performance and observation of the same action. 
Experimental studies demonstrating automatic imitation have been used as an index of the 
functioning of the MNS (Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000; Heyes, Bird, 
Johnson, & Haggard, 2005; Stürmer, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2000). Thus, the MNS gives us 
one example of a shared representational system between ‘self’ and ‘other’, as it maps 
representations of others’ actions onto those of our own (Iacoboni et al., 1999). 
1.1.2.  Theory of mind, perspective-taking and empathy.  Similarly, another key 
domain of social cognition for which simultaneous representation of ‘self’ and ‘other’ is 
particularly important is that of theory of mind. This concerns the ability to attribute mental 
states to both the self and others, recognising that two individuals may simultaneously hold 
different beliefs, desires and intentions in any given social situation (Premack & Woodruff, 
1978). Moreover, throughout social interactions, humans constantly represent their own 
visual perspectives on the world, but also those of the individuals with whom they interact. 
Like in the motor domain, representations of mental states and perspectives of the self and 
other have been shown to recruit overlapping brain regions, found to centre around the 
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC; Anderson, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1999; 
Ferstl & von Cramon, 2002; Lombardo et al., 2010a; Saxe, Moran, Scholz, & Gabrieli, 2006).  
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Finally, the ability to empathise with our conspecifics is yet another ability necessary for 
mature and successful social cognition (Harris, de Rosnay, & Pons, 2005). Despite the 
complex and multi-faceted nature of emotion understanding, basic empathy requires an 
individual to comprehend the affective states of both the self and of those with whom they 
interact. There is a body of work concerning common neural networks recruited during 
directly experienced pain and empathy for others’ pain (Jackson, Brunet, Meltzoff, & Decety, 
2006; Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 2011; Obhi & Cross, 2016), as well as evidence from 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI; Hennenlotter et al., 2005; Singer et al., 2004; 
Wicker et al., 2003) and lesion studies (Calder, Keane, Manes, Antoun, & Young, 2000; 
Hutchinson, Davis, Lozano, Tasker, & Dostrovsky, 1999) that key regions involved in 
emotion processing for the self show overlap with processing emotions of others. These 
include motor and somatosensory areas of the brain but also the anterior insula and anterior 
cingulate cortex.  
Although the factor structure and relation between different domains is only 
beginning to be revealed (Happé, Cook, & Bird, 2017), we see commonalities here in each of 
these domains as individuals simultaneously hold neural representations pertaining to both 
the self and to other people (Obhi & Cross, 2016). If we have such shared representational 
systems which recruit overlapping brain regions (Decety & Sommerville, 2003; Keysers & 
Gazzola, 2009), why is it that we do not perform every action we observe or confuse the pain 
or emotional state experienced by another individual as belonging to ourselves? As well as a 





1.2.  A Candidate Mechanism 
Social interaction in a variety of domains appears dependent on a shared 
representational system. However, success in a social situation sometimes requires an 
individual to distance themselves from other people and in other instances requires one to 
engage more with their representations of others. For example, when taking another’s 
perspective, engaging a successful theory of mind, or empathising with others, it is important 
to put aside or inhibit one’s own perspective, mental or affective state and enhance that of the 
interacting other. This is evident in the moral judgement task used by Young and colleagues 
(Young, Camprodon, Hauser, Pascual-Leone, & Saxe 2010) which requires the participants 
to assess the morality of a character in putting sugar labelled as ‘toxic’ into her friend’s 
coffee. The participant knows that the powder is in fact sugar, but the character believes it is 
toxic. Therefore, in successfully assessing the morality of the character’s action, the observer 
must enhance the representation of the character’s mental state and inhibit that of their own. 
Conversely, when partaking in social interaction, to control the tendency to imitate others’ 
actions and instead generate our own independent actions, we must inhibit the motor 
representation we hold for the interacting other and activate the motor representation for our 
own intended action (Brass, Derrfuss, & von Cramon, 2005; Brass et al., 2009). These 
examples are discrepant in their requirement for self- versus other-representation 
enhancement – perspective taking, theory of mind and empathy require the other to be 
enhanced and the self inhibited, while the control of imitation requires the self to be enhanced 
and the other inhibited. It appears therefore, that it may be crucial to have the ability to 
control or switch between neural representations attributed to the self and to other people 
(Brass & Heyes, 2005; Cook, 2014; Decety & Sommerville, 2003; Spengler et al., 2009a).  
As we see the requirement for control across social domains, it is important to note 
that this mechanism does not modulate specifically at the motor or sensory level. Herein 
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referred to as ‘self-other control’, such a mechanism explains how, depending on task 
relevance and task demands we are able to enhance one representation whilst inhibiting the 
other, via a domain-general attentional modulation of competing self- and other-related 
representations (Cook, 2014; Sowden & Shah, 2014). Accordingly, despite the very different 
high-level cognitive processes involved in a wide range of social cognitive abilities, it 
appears that many may rely on this common mechanism of self-other control.  
1.2.1.  Measuring self-other control.  A task now readily used as a behavioural index 
of self-other control is that of the control of imitation (Figure 1; Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 
2001; Brass et al., 2005, 2009; Catmur & Heyes, 2011; Santiesteban, Banissy, Catmur, & 
Bird, 2012a, 2015a; Santiesteban, Bird, Tew, Cioffi, & Banissy, 2015b; Santiesteban et al., 
2012b; Sowden & Catmur, 2015; Spengler et al., 2009a). The task concerns inhibiting 
imitative response tendencies (thus is often called the ‘imitation-inhibition’ task) and requires 
subjects to produce body movements (often finger abductions along the vertical or horizontal 
plane) in response to a non-social, visual cue (such as a number or coloured square). Task 
irrelevant hand stimuli are simultaneously observed and perform movements which are either 
imitatively compatible or incompatible with those to be performed by the subject. Response 
time differences between compatible and incompatible trials are considered an index of an 
individual’s ability to control the competing representations of self and other; exciting the 
self-representation, whilst inhibiting the other-representation. Chapters 2 (Sowden, Koehne, 
Catmur, Dziobek, & Bird, 2016a) and 3 (Sowden, Brewer, Catmur, & Bird, 2016b) of the 
current thesis utilise this task as an index of self-other control.  
Additionally, Obhi and Hogeveen (2013) have proposed a complimentary task which 
allows the inspection of performance under the opposite control requirements; inhibiting the 
self-representation whilst exciting the other-representation. During 50% of trials where the 
(previously) task-irrelevant hand stimulus is observed to perform a movement, individuals 
17 
must inhibit the cued action and instead perform that of the task-irrelevant hand. In 
combination, these complimentary tasks provide a neat index of control; the ability to supress 
not only representations of the other but also of the self.    
A question arising from this, however, is to what extent such a mechanism of self-
other control extends across domains of social cognition. Despite the very different higher-
level cognitive processes involved in a wide range of social cognitive abilities, a series of 
behavioural findings in neurotypical adults support the existence of a common low-level 
mechanism of self-other control. Performance in one social domain such as the control of 
imitation correlates highly with performance in other social domains requiring self-other 
control. These include perspective-taking, theory of mind and empathy (Spengler, Bird, & 
Brass, 2010a), and remain even when controlling for more general executive functioning 
processes (e.g., Spengler, von Cramon, & Brass, 2010b).  
  
 
Lift Index finger Lift middle finger 
    







Figure 1. Examples of task-irrelevant hand stimuli and task-relevant cues presented during a 
task to measure the control of imitation or the imitation-inhibition task. Imitative compatibility 
of the task-irrelevant stimuli with the required finger lift response is also indicated for trials in 
which an orange square indicates lift index and a purple square indicates lift middle. Adapted 
from Sowden and Shah (2014). 
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The perspective-taking task is worthy of outlining in more detail here as it has also 
been used as an index of the integrity of one’s self-other control (Santiesteban et al., 2012a, 
2012b, 2015a, 2015b). In the Director Task (Figure 2; Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Brauner, 2000) 
the participant views a block of shelves. Standing on the other side of the shelves is a person 
(the ‘director’) and a number of the shelves are occluded from the director’s viewpoint, 
whilst visible to the participant. Therefore, when instructed by the director to move objects 
around the shelves (up, down, left or right), to demonstrate good visual perspective-taking 
and thus self-other control, the participant must inhibit the self visual perspective and 
enhance that of the director (other), moving only the objects which are visible to the director 
and in the instructed direction with respect to the director’s viewpoint. Crucially, 
Santiesteban and colleagues, in two separate samples of healthy controls (Santiesteban et al., 
2012b, 2015b), found that performance on the imitation-inhibition and visual perspective-
taking tasks was correlated. 
The link between performance on different tasks requiring self-other control is not 
merely correlational; just 40 minutes of training to inhibit imitation produced an enhancement 
of perspective-taking ability (Santiesteban et al., 2012b), as well as increases in empathic 
corticospinal responses and self-reported empathy (de Guzman, Bird, Banissy, & Catmur, 
2016). Participants were trained to inhibit the other- and enhance the self-representation, and 
this led to enhancements in social domains requiring inhibition of the self- and enhancement 
of the other-representation. Moreover, priming prosocial attitudes enhances automatic 
imitation but not a non-imitative control process (Cook & Bird, 2011; Leighton, Bird, Orsini, 
& Heyes, 2010), and engaging in more social interaction (Hogeveen & Obhi, 2012) or merely 
being imitated (Hogeveen, Chartrand, & Obhi, 2015) leads to increased neural representation 
of others. These examples all support the enhancement of a common process involved in 
social functioning. It also appears specific to social cognition as such modulation was not 
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observed on equivalent, non-social control tasks (Cook & Bird, 2011; Leighton et al., 2010; 












Figure 2. Example stimuli from the ‘Director Task’; visual perspective-taking task. On the 
left is a control, no conflict trial where there is no conflict between the visual perspective of 
the self and the other in relation to the item instructed to be moved. On the right is an 
experimental trial where there is a conflict between the visual perspective of the self and the 
other in relation to the object instructed to be moved. In this situation, the participant must 
inhibit the representation they hold for their own visual perspective and enhance that of the 
director in order to move the correct object. Measures of performance relate to response times 
and accuracy to complete the instructed movement on each trial. 
 
 
Thus, we have seen two robust indexes of self-other control, whereby the task elicits 
the online representation of self and other and which require the control or modulation of 
these representations for successful performance. Further social tasks which elicit similar 
cognitive demands could be used to demonstrate that self-other control is key across social 
domains. Chapter 5 (Sowden, Wright, Banissy, Catmur, & Bird, 2015), Experiment 1 of this 
thesis concerns this, extending self-other control to other, more high-level domains of social 
cognition and this chapter describes a novel task designed to elicit online self-other 
“Move the large candle up” “Move the large candle up” 
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interference effects in the context of opinions and lie detection.1 The same task is then used to 
probe at the neural basis of this mechanism (Chapter 5, Experiment 2) and functioning of 
self-other control in individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD; Chapter 6).  
1.2.2.  A neural basis for self-other control: The temporoparietal junction.  As 
well as the mPFC, the temporoparietal junction (TPJ), a brain region located at the 
intersection of the superior temporal sulcus, lateral occipital cortex and inferior parietal 
lobule (Figure 3; Mars et al., 2012), has attracted extensive research attention over the past 
decade, emerging as a key node within the ‘social brain’ network (Frith & Frith, 2010; see 
Table 1 for more details on studies). Meta-analytic investigations of the function of the TPJ, 
focusing mainly on the right TPJ, have revealed its important role in a wide range of social 
cognitive abilities, including judging agency, perspective-taking, theory of mind and empathy 
(Figure 4; Decety & Lamm, 2007; Decety & Sommerville, 2003; Sperduti, Delaveau, Fossati, 
& Nadel, 2011; van Overwalle, 2009). These overlapping neural correlates indeed support the 
existence of a common neurocognitive mechanism and accordingly, Brass and colleagues 
(Brass et al., 2001, 2005, 2009; Spengler et al., 2009a, 2009b) utilised fMRI to localise the 
mechanism of self-other control, as indexed by the control of imitation, to the right TPJ and 
mPFC. The authors suggest both areas to be implicated in overcoming interference from 
observed behaviour, but the right TPJ to be particularly important in determining whether the 
action is performed by the self or the other, with the mPFC primarily managing and enforcing 
our own motor representations and actions as a result.  
 
 
                                                          
1 By ‘high-level’ we are referring to domains involving more than just automatic, unconscious processes, but 
which may involve more conscious reasoning and interpretation and perhaps higher working memory demands. 
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 Figure 3. Visual depiction of the location of the temporoparietal junction, at the intersection 
of the superior temporal sulcus, lateral occipital cortex and inferior parietal lobule. Adapted 







Figure 4. The anatomy of the human brain in x-y-z stereotactic atlas. Showing (left) the right 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and superior temporal sulcus (STS) and (right) the areas in the 
right TPJ recruited in studies investigating various social cognitive abilities. Adapted from 




Social function Relevant supporting literature Method 
Empathy 
Botvinick et al. (2005); Jackson et al. (2005, 2006); Lamm, 
Batson, & Decety (2007); Lawrence et al. (2006); Moriguchi 
et al. (2007); Singer et al. (2004); Voellm et al. (2006) 
fMRI 
Decety & Chaminade (2003); Ruby & Decety (2004) PET 
Control of imitation 
Brass et al. (2001, 2003, 2005, 2009); Spengler et al. (2009a, 
2010a); Williams et al. (2006) 
fMRI 
Chaminade, Meltzoff, & Decety (2002); Decety et al. (2002) PET 
Hogeveen et al. (2015); Nobusako et al. (2017); Santiesteban 
et al. (2012a, 2015a) 
tDCS 
Sowden & Catmur (2015) TMS 
Judging agency 
Chaminade & Decety (2002); Farrer et al. (2003, 2004); 
Ruby & Decety (2001); Spence et al. (1997) 
PET 
Farrer & Frith (2002); Kable & Chatterjee (2006); Leube et 
al. (2003); Ramnani & Miall (2004); Saxe et al. (2004); 




David et al. (2006); Hynes, Baird, & Grafton (2006); Ruby 
& Decety (2001, 2003)  
fMRI 
Nobusako et al. (2017); Santiesteban et al. (2012a) tDCS 
 
Theory of mind 
Baron-Cohen et al. (1999a); Castelli et al. (2000); den 
Ouden et al. (2005); Gallagher & Frith (2003); Gallagher et 
al. (2000); Grèzes, Frith, & Passingham (2004); Moriguchi 
et al. (2006); Ohnishi et al. (2004); Perner et al. (2006); 
Rilling et al. (2004); Saxe (2009, 2010); Saxe & Kanwisher 
(2003); Saxe & Powell (2006); Saxe & Wexler (2005); 
Scholz et al. (2009); Spengler et al. (2009a); Vogeley et al. 
(2001); Walter et al. (2004); Young et al. (2007) 
fMRI 
Brunet et al. (2000, 2003); Fletcher et al. (1995) PET 
 Bardi et al. (2017); Costa et al. (2008); Young et al. (2010) TMS 
 Mai et al. (2016) tDCS 
Self/other body 
representation 
Cazzato et al. (2015); Tsakiris et al. (2008) TMS 
Lie detection Sowden et al. (2015) tDCS 
Table 1 
Relevant Literature and Neuroscientific Methods Supporting the Role of the Right 
Temporoparietal junction in Various Social Functions. 
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Further, causal evidence for the role of the right TPJ in self-other control is derived 
from studies measuring the effects of magnetic or electrical stimulation of this area. 
Disruptive repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) of the right TPJ has been 
shown to impair performance in both the control of imitation (Sowden & Catmur, 2015) and 
theory of mind (Bardi, Six, & Brass, 2017; Costa, Torriero, Oliveri, & Caltagirone, 2008; 
Young et al., 2010). Anodal (excitatory) transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) 
enhanced imitative control and perspective-taking performance, whilst cathodal and sham 
stimulation to the same area, and active control stimulation to an alternative area, had no 
effect on performance in these tasks. This excitatory effect has now been replicated across 3 
studies (Hogeveen et al., 2015; Santiesteban et al., 2012a, 2015a) and this stimulation has 
been shown to be effective when stimulating both left and right TPJ (Santiesteban et al., 
2015a). Moreover, the same protocol of anodal tDCS to the right TPJ resulted in enhanced 
theory of mind performance in another study (Mai et al., 2016). The work of Santiesteban and 
colleagues is particularly noteworthy here, whereby the paradox of improved performance in 
these two tasks results from the opposing modulation of representations of self and other. 
Excitation of the TPJ promoted an enhanced representation of the self relative to the other in 
the imitation task and the other relative to the self in the perspective-taking task. As with the 
previous observation of behavioural training in one social domain leading to enhanced 
performance in another domain where there are opposing requirements of self versus other 
enhancement/inhibition, this pattern of results is best explained by the up-regulation of a 
mechanism which facilitates the control of self and other representations. Thus, it appears to 
be a dynamic mechanism capable of modulating behaviour based on the specific demands of 
a given social situation or experimental task.  
Similarly, acquired temporoparietal lesions have been associated with rare disorders 
such as asomatognosia, characterised by the misidentification of part of one’s own body as 
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belonging to another (Feinberg, Venneri, Simone, Fan, & Northoff, 2010) and anosognosia, 
characterised by a denial or unawareness of a paralysed limb (Ramachandran & Blakeslee, 
1998). The deficits here also suggest impairments in self-other control, whereby self-other 
representations are poorly discriminated and self-representations, maladaptively inhibited. 
1.2.2.1.  The problem of the multimodal function of the TPJ. It is important to 
recognise that the TPJ has for a long time been described as a multimodal area of the brain, 
with the precise anatomy and functional role of this region remaining a controversial issue. 
For example, the TPJ has a well-documented role in the reorienting of attention (Corbetta & 
Shulman, 2002), the ability to switch one’s focus of attention towards an unexpected, external 
stimulus. The TPJ has been considered a ‘circuit breaker’ in the context of attention 
(Corbetta, Patel, & Shulman, 2008). However, as already discussed, there is also a suggested 
role for the TPJ in various domains of social cognition (Decety & Lamm, 2007), and the 
more specific suggestion that it is involved in controlling or switching between 
representations of the self and of other people (Brass et al., 2005, 2009; Hogeveen et al., 
2015; Santiesteban et al., 2012a, 2015a; Sowden & Catmur, 2015; Spengler et al., 2010b). Of 
particular contention is whether the region should be considered a unified region serving 
cognitive functions via a domain-general attentional control mechanism, or whether it has a 
domain-specific influence on each cognitive function it is reported to subserve (Donaldson, 
Rinehart, & Enticott, 2015). This is an important issue to consider with respect to the current 
thesis. 
Despite claims that the TPJ cannot be selective for processes such as theory of mind 
and attentional orienting (Mitchell, 2008), recent evidence, as well as methodological flaws 
in the original investigation of this question, does indeed suggest something specialised about 
the TPJ’s involvement in social cognition. For example, Scholz, Triantafyllou, Whitfield-
Gabrieli, Brown, and Saxe (2009) claimed that previous findings of overlap in the precise 
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region of the TPJ recruited for attention and theory of mind (Mitchell, 2008) were due to low 
spatial resolution, and they in fact demonstrated distinct neural correlates for these two 
processes using higher resolution fMRI. Additionally, research is now revealing how the TPJ 
functions within different networks in the brain, and thus revealing other regions which might 
contribute to the neural input and output organisation of the TPJ. This is key in appreciating 
that no single brain region in isolation is responsible for a particular social cognitive function. 
Connectivity-based imaging has identified sub-regions within the TPJ, which participate in 
different cortical networks (Mars et al., 2012). An anterior cluster within the TPJ was found 
to have neural input and output projections to the ventral prefrontal cortex and anterior insula, 
while a posterior cluster of the TPJ was functionally connected to the posterior cingulate, 
temporal pole, and anterior medial prefrontal cortex. A recent activation likelihood estimation 
meta-analysis of 47 neuroimaging studies also confirms a role for the posterior right TPJ in 
the social domain, whilst anterior areas of the right TPJ were attributed to attentional as well 
as social processing (Krall et al., 2015). Thus, it is important to consider how the TPJ 
contributes to different functional networks which in combination supports its involvement in 
specific cognitive functions. 
A handful of other issues must also be observed here, however. Firstly, the measures 
used in these studies to assess the TPJ’s role in social vs. non-social processes often have 
very different cognitive demands and it is difficult to determine whether measures of social 
cognition are actually measuring something uniquely ‘social’ or just a domain general 
process. For example, it is difficult to rule out whether the differential neural responses found 
may simply reflect an aspect of the stimuli or task instructions, rather than differences in the 
underlying mechanism(s) of interest. Klapper, Ramsey, Wigboldus, and Cross (2014) 
manipulated the social nature of the imitation-inhibition task by modulating animacy of the 
observed hand stimulus within the same task. Utilising fMRI, they demonstrated increased 
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congruency effects in the right TPJ (indexed by greater differences in activation between 
congruent and incongruent trials) the more ‘social’ the task appeared to the participant (i.e. 
the more human-like the observed stimulus appeared to participants). This suggests the TPJ 
may be involved in more of a specialised capacity in imitation control, rather than simply a 
domain-general mechanism of conflict management. Nevertheless, there is still a lack of 
causal evidence for network distinctions within the TPJ. Sowden and Catmur (2015) sought 
to mitigate the above concerns by administering disruptive repetitive TMS to the right TPJ or 
a control mid-occipital (MO) site during a variation on the imitation-inhibition task. 2 They 
introduced a non-social, attentional control variant of the task, whereby performance can be 
measured both to control imitative response tendencies, but also to control the tendency to 
respond in a spatially compatible location to the observed finger movement. These two 
control processes (one social and one non-social in nature) have been shown to develop 
across different time courses (Catmur & Heyes, 2011), and Sowden and Catmur showed 
selective modulation of performance in the social, but not the non-social, control process of 
the task during disruptive repetitive TMS to the right TPJ.  
In conclusion, evidence does support the idea that subregions within the TPJ may 
exist which participate in different neural networks and thus have the capacity to control 
different cognitive functions in a domain-specific fashion. Thus, investigating its involvement 
in a self-other control mechanism which is specific to social cognition seems well supported. 
1.3.  Atypical Social Cognitive Function 
Uncovering a common low-level mechanism for social cognition centred around self-
other representation seems particularly useful when considering atypical social cognitive 
function (Catmur, Cross, & Over, 2015). Mirror touch synaesthesia, a condition in which the 
                                                          
2 The MO region was used as an active control site as there was no a priori reason to assume that stimulation to 
this region would differ from baseline. 
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observation of touch or pain to others elicits an overt somatic sensation in the synaesthete’s 
own body, is associated with structural abnormalities in the TPJ, specifically with reduced 
grey matter volume (Grice-Jackson, Critchley, Banissy, & Ward, 2017; Holle, Banissy, & 
Ward, 2013). Behaviourally these individuals also demonstrate atypical self-other control, 
showing difficulties in imitation-inhibition (Santiesteban et al., 2015b), problems with 
judging self/other ownership over body parts (Aimola-Davies & White, 2013), and general 
atypical representation of the self (Maister, Banissy, & Tsakiris, 2013). Therefore, as 
individuals with mirror touch synaesthesia have abnormalities in the TPJ, in addition to those 
areas involved in vicarious somatosensory mirroring, and they have behavioural 
abnormalities in social domains requiring self-other control, mirror touch synaesthesia could 
be described as one example of a disorder of self-other control (Banissy & Ward, 2013; 
Santiesteban et al., 2015b; Ward & Banissy, 2015). 
Furthermore, the ability to control neural representations of the self and of other people 
seems a central aspect of more common disorders of social cognition, such as autism and 
schizophrenia (Ferri et al., 2012; Spengler et al., 2010b). The aetiology and cognitive profile 
of ASD, the prototypical neurodevelopmental disorder of social cognition, will now be 
considered, and how the social impairments experienced by these individuals fit with the idea 
of impaired self-other control will be discussed. 
1.3.1.  Autism Spectrum Disorder and self-other control 
1.3.1.1.  Diagnosis and aetiology.  Whilst originally considered to arise from 
environmental factors (Hanson & Gottesman, 1976), autism now stands out as one of the 
most highly heritable of all psychiatric and developmental disorders (Freitag, 2007; Plomin, 
Owen, & McGuffin, 1994). Behavioural genetics twin studies initially proposed conservative 
heritability estimates of 60% for autism as a single facet (Bailey et al., 1995; Folstein & 
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Rutter, 1977; Ritvo, Freeman, Mason-Brothers, Mo, & Ritvo, 1985; Steffenburg et al., 
1989).3 ASD is a life-long condition with an estimated prevalence of 1-2%, and is about three 
times more common in males than females (Baird et al., 2006; Baxter et al., 2015). However, 
it is suggested that females with ASD are often missed in the diagnosis process, perhaps 
because they are better able to compensate for their symptoms than males with ASD 
(Dworzynski, Ronald, Bolton, & Happé, 2012; Livingston & Happé, 2017). 
Early research was quick to recognise that autism could be characterised by distinct 
impairments in behavioural functioning. This began with Leo Kanner’s (Kanner, 1943; 
Kanner & Eisenberg, 1956) depiction of autism as a disorder with two main deficits; the 
social and the non-social and was later extended to form a diagnostically useful ‘triad of 
impairments’ (Figure 5) comprising social impairments, communication impairments and 
rigid and repetitive behaviours and interests (Rutter, 1978; Wing & Gould, 1978). Finally, in 
the most recent revision of the Diagnostic Statistical Manual-5, all subcategories (including 
Asperger’s syndrome) were combined under the single heading of ‘ASD’ (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013), and the triad of impairments was reduced to two categories; 
social communication and/or interaction difficulties, and restricted and/or repetitive 
behaviours. However, as it is still appreciated that ASD is a highly heterogenous disorder, a 
broad diagnosis is given along with details of the individual’s specific areas of impairment.  
Behavioural genetic studies also demonstrate that the core impairments of ASD are 
fractionable in their aetiology (Brunsdon & Happé, 2014). Heritability estimates increase to 
around 90% when social and non-social impairments are considered separately (Ronald & 
Hoekstra, 2011), and each have been shown to possess some separate genetic influences on 
                                                          
3 Estimates of heritability are calculated by comparing concordance for behavioural traits between monozygotic 
and dizygotic twins. Concordance is calculated as the proportion of twins who possess the trait of interest and 
those who have a co-twin with the trait. 
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their development (Ronald, Happé, & Plomin, 2005; Ronald & Hoekstra, 2011).4 Ronald and 
colleagues (Ronald et al., 2006) demonstrate strong genetic correlations between a single trait 
exhibited in the extremes of the population (the top 5% of the distribution) and the same trait 
exhibited sub-clinically in the rest of the distribution. This supports the notion that sub-
threshold autistic traits not only exist, but possess the same aetiology throughout the 
population. It also supports the investigation of general population samples with respect to 
population level autistic traits to aid a greater understanding of autism throughout the 
spectrum. Thus, Chapters 2, 6 and 7 take a dimensional approach to the investigation of ASD 














Figure 5. Visual depiction of the three main facets of the triadic impairments in autism 
suggested prior to the most recent revision of the Diagnostic Statistical Manual. Taken from 
http://labspace.open.ac.uk/mod/resource/view.php?id=482959. 
                                                          
4 Multivariate genetic analyses examine genetic and environmental influences on the covariance between traits; 
the extent to which the genetic and environmental influences acting on one trait also act on one or more other 
traits. 
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In terms of the search for specific genes which contribute to the presence of autism, 
very few candidate genes with reliable and replicable effect sizes have been identified in the 
last three decades of molecular genetic research (Barnby & Monaco, 2003; Sykes & Lamb, 
2007; Yang & Gill, 2007). It has in fact been proposed that multiple genes with small effect 
sizes may be partly responsible for many behavioural disorders such as ASD, which 
somewhat helps to explain the large heterogeneity in the autism phenotype. 
1.3.1.2.  Social cognitive impairments in ASD.  As mentioned, autism is thought to 
be made up of two or three core impairments, including social communication and/or 
interaction, and rigid and/or repetitive behaviours and interests. Restrictive interests may 
involve preoccupation with particular classes of objects or with knowledge of a particular 
topic, as well as rigid routines (which induce anxiety if altered) and atypicalities in motor 
skills. The autism phenotype is also thought to include general poor executive functioning, 
which encompasses dysfunction in cognitive control such as planning, working memory, 
attention, problem solving, set-shifting and verbal reasoning (Courchesne et al., 1994; Happé, 
Booth, Charlton, & Hughes, 2006; Ozonoff, 1997) and is argued to reflect frontal lobe 
dysfunction (Hill, 2004). Weak central coherence, characterised by a focus on small details at 
the expense of the whole, is another non-social domain of impairment observed in individuals 
with ASD (Happé, 2005; Happé, Frith, & Briskman, 2001). Impairments in central coherence 
and executive functioning are suggested to account, in part, for the rigid and repetitive 
behaviours associated with ASD (Boyd, Mcbee, Holtzclaw, Baranek, & Bodfish, 2009; 
Kenworthy, Black, Harrison, Della Rosa, & Wallace, 2009; Le Monda, Holtzer, & Goldman, 
2012), but also to relate to some aspects of social interaction (Kenworthy et al., 2009).  
However, a prominent aspect of ASD is the associated broad range of social and 
communication impairments (Happé & Ronald, 2008; Rutter, 1978). Similar questions are 
now being asked regarding the inter-dependence of various cognitive impairments within the 
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social domain in ASD. If ASD is characterised by impairments across social cognitive 
functions found to be correlated in typically functioning individuals (Brass & Spengler, 2008; 
Brass et al., 2005, 2009; Spengler et al., 2009a), perhaps these may not only be 
developmentally linked, but may rely on a common underlying process (Happé et al., 2017; 
Sowden & Shah, 2014) which may be impaired in individuals with ASD. Therefore, although 
not an exhaustive outline of the cognitive impairments in ASD, an overview will be given of 
some of the social cognitive processes impaired in ASD which reveal the potential for a 
common parsimonious mechanistic explanation.    
 Individuals with autism consistently perform poorly during theory of mind tasks 
(Baron-Cohen, 2001; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Senju, Southgate, White, & Frith, 
2009; Spengler et al., 2010b). These tasks require an individual to represent and distinguish 
mental states pertaining to both the self and others, including thoughts, desires and intentions, 
in order to predict behaviour (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). For example, children with 
autism often perform poorly on false belief tasks where they are required to understand that a 
character in a story may hold a different belief to oneself, or to another character in the story 
(Baron-Cohen, O’Riordan, Jones, Stone, & Plaisted, 1999b; Happé, 1994; White, Hill, 
Happé, & Frith, 2009). Many false beliefs tasks can be passed by high-functioning 
individuals with ASD (Bowler, 1992; Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1991), however, once 
high enough demands are placed on theory of mind, high-functioning individuals with ASD 
do demonstrate impairments here (Castelli, Frith, Happé, & Frith, 2002; Mathersul, 
McDonald, & Rushby, 2013).  
 Furthermore, perspective-taking involves the ability to see the world from another 
person’s perspective, and there are reports of atypical basic visual perspective-taking in 
individuals with autism (Dawson & Fernald, 1987; Hamilton, Brindley, & Frith, 2009; 
Leekam, Baron-Cohen, Perrett, Milders, & Brown, 1997; Reed, 2002; Warreyn, Roeyers, 
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Oelbrandt, & De Groote, 2005; Yirmiya, Sigman, & Zacks, 1994; Zwickel, White, Coniston, 
Senju, & Frith, 2010). However, there are some inconsistencies here, with not all studies 
finding deficits in ASD (see Pearson, Ropar, & Hamilton, 2013 for a review of this 
literature). There is some suggestion that this may be due to tasks in which ceiling effects are 
observed, particularly in high-functioning adult samples, as well as poor matching of 
intellectual function in a number of studies investigating perspective-taking in ASD (Pearson 
et al., 2013). Moreover, there is some discussion regarding different levels of perspective-
taking which may exist, as well as whether or not perspective-taking can be considered an 
independent social cognitive construct to that of theory of mind (Hamilton et al., 2009). 
Additionally, although not required diagnostic criteria for ASD, atypicalities have 
been reported in the ability to represent and distinguish emotional states and actions of the 
self and others, which may play a role in the ability to empathise with, and imitate, those with 
whom one interacts (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Bird & Viding, 2014; Thaler et al., 
2017; Williams, Whiten, & Singh, 2004; Williams, Whiten, Suddendorf, & Perrett, 2001). 
Importantly, however, these atypicalities are not always observed as diminished empathy or 
imitation. For example, there is suggestion that empathy may in fact be heightened in 
individuals with ASD (Markram, Rinaldi, & Markram, 2007; Smith, 2006, 2009), and it has 
also been reported that these individuals may not lack imitative behaviour, but may in fact 
over-imitate others’ actions compared to controls (Bird, Leighton, Press, & Heyes, 2007; 
Spengler et al., 2010a). Thus, perhaps a mechanism of control or modulation of social 
behaviour may be the underlying deficit here. Furthermore, there is also the suggestion that 
deficits in empathy may not be characteristic of ASD, but may be associated with another 
condition called alexithymia, whereby individuals struggle to identify and describe their own 
and others’ emotions (Bird & Cook, 2013; Cook, Brewer, Shah, & Bird, 2013; Sifneos, 
1973), but we will return to the discussion of this later. 
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Despite the appealing proposition that these broad range of social impairments can be 
explained by a dysfunction in the MNS, termed the ‘Broken Mirror Theory’ of autism 
(Dapretto et al., 2006; Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006; Ramachandran & Oberman, 2006; 
Rizzolatti & Fabbri-Desto, 2010; Williams et al., 2001, 2004), there is now support for an 
intact mirror system in individuals with ASD (Bird et al., 2007; Dinstein et al., 2010; Fan, 
Decety, Yang, Liu, & Cheng, 2010; Hamilton, Brindley, & Frith, 2007; Leighton, Bird, 
Charman, & Heyes, 2008; Press, Richardson, & Bird, 2010; Southgate & Hamilton, 2008; 
Spengler et al., 2010b). Furthermore, previous claims that mirror neurons are involved in 
everything from imitation (Iacoboni et al., 1999), to action understanding (Gallese & 
Sinigaglia, 2011; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996), theory of mind (Iacoboni et 
al., 2005), empathy (Avenanti, Bueti, Galati, & Aglioti, 2005) and language processing 
(Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998) are now highly disputed (Cook, Bird, Catmur, Press, & Heyes, 
2014), and thus the Broken Mirror Theory seems a less plausible common explanation for the 
social impairments observed in ASD.  
Nevertheless, it is important to consider that ASD may still be characterised by 
atypical neural representations of the self and of other people even if not in the form of 
atypical MNS function. Various investigations have revealed atypical neural self-
representation in prefrontal regions of the brain (Kennedy & Courchesne, 2008; Lombardo et 
al., 2010b; Uddin et al., 2008) as well as reduced neural representation of others (Hobson & 
Meyer, 2005; Kennedy & Courchesne, 2008; Meyer & Hobson, 2004). A handful of studies 
have postulated deficient self-other differentiation or control to explain impairments in 
inhibiting imitation, theory of mind and perspective-taking (Lombardo, Chakrabarti, 
Bullmore, & Baron-Cohen, 2011; Lombardo et al., 2010b; Spengler et al., 2010a, 2010b). 
The latter studies in particular deserve more attention. Lombardo and colleagues (Lombardo 
et al., 2011) identified impairments in the recruitment of the right TPJ when making 
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judgments requiring self-other differentiation in individuals with ASD relative to controls. 
Thus, although it is clear that both mPFC and right TPJ are crucially involved in neural 
representations of the self and the other (Brass et al., 2005, 2009), the right TPJ appears 
particularly important in facilitating the control or modulation of these competing 
representations. Similarly, Spengler and colleagues (Spengler et al., 2010b) found that, in a 
sample of high functioning individuals with ASD, increased imitation was associated with 
reduced theory of mind and decreased activity in areas typically required for self-other 
control. Despite varied terminology, including self-other “differentiation,” “distinction,” 
“switching” or “agency,” all postulated processes appear to share a common feature of the 
“control” of shared representations. 
Indeed, more recently it has been suggested that the processes deficient in ASD are 
those involved in the top-down modulation of social behaviour (Cook, Barbalat, & 
Blakemore, 2012; Cook & Bird, 2012; Southgate & Hamilton, 2008; Spengler et al., 2010b; 
Wang & Hamilton, 2012). Of particular note, Cook and Bird (2012) found that the 
modulatory effects of priming pro-social attitudes on self-other control observed in 
neurotypical adults were absent in individuals with ASD. Moreover, individuals with ASD 
have been shown to respond much more slowly to the effects of being imitated on 
enhancements in empathy for others’ pain, when compared to typical controls (De Coster, 
Wiersema, Deschrijver, & Brass, 2017).  
Consequently, the mechanism of self-other control considered here, as a form of top-
down modulation of behaviour, has the capacity to explain the broad range of social deficits 
commonly observed in ASD. Naturally this may also extend to our understanding of the 
social impairments observed in various other clinical disorders such as schizophrenia. 
Schizophrenia is a disorder also associated with behavioural impairments in the control of 
self and other representations (Ferri et al., 2012; Graham-Schmidt, Martin-Iverson, & Waters, 
35 
in press; van der Weiden, Prikken, & van Haren, 2015), as well as abnormalities in the 
structure and function of the TPJ (Allen, Larøi, McGuire, & Aleman, 2008; Benedetti et al., 
2009; Brüne et al., 2008, 2011; Cook et al., 2012). Taken together, neuroimaging evidence to 
date is suggestive of the TPJ’s important role in a common neurocognitive mechanism which 
may be deficient across disorders. Let us now consider a further condition which we know to 
be highly co-morbid with ASD and which is suggested to account for the emotional 
symptoms of ASD (Bird & Cook, 2013); alexithymia. 
1.3.2.  Alexithymia and self-other control.  Alexithymia is a sub-clinical construct 
characterised by an inability to identify and describe one’s own and others’ emotions 
(Sifneos, 1973) and it is now known to co-occur with a range of psychiatric disorders 
associated with social cognitive impairments (Brewer, Cook, & Bird, 2016a; Murphy, 
Brewer, Catmur, & Bird, 2017). These include ASD (Bird & Cook, 2013; Cook et al., 2013), 
eating disorders (Brewer, Cook, Cardi, Treasure, & Bird, 2015), schizophrenia (Van’t Wout, 
Aleman, Bermond, & Kahn, 2007), addiction (Verdejo-Garcia, Clark, & Dunn, 2012), 
obsessive compulsive disorder (Grabe et al., 2006), anxiety (Hendryx, Haviland, & Shaw, 
1991), and major depressive disorder (Honkalampi, Hintikka, Tanskanen, Lehtonen, & 
Viinamäki, 2000). For example, the prevalence of alexithymia in the general population is 5-
10%, but approximately 50% in the ASD population (Berthoz & Hill, 2005; Hill, Berthoz, & 
Frith, 2004; Kokkonen et al., 2001) and 60% in the eating disorder population (Cochrane, 
Brewerton, Wilson, & Hodges, 1993). Alexithymia has now been suggested to be 
characterised as a general impairment in interoception; the perception of the internal state of 
one’s own body (Brewer, Cook, & Bird, 2016a, 2016b; Murphy, Catmur, & Bird, in press), 
and recent computational models within the predictive coding framework suggest that the 
ability to distinguish between self and other is also dependent upon interoception (Seth, 2013; 
Quattrocki & Friston, 2014).  
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As it is suggested that good interoceptive awareness may be crucial for awareness of 
one’s own body and its distinction from others, it may be conceptually predicted that lower 
interoceptive accuracy (and accordingly, high levels of alexithymia) would result in a 
reduced ability to control competing representations of the self and others (Quattrocki & 
Friston, 2014). However, one empirical study in fact found that superior interoceptive 
accuracy was related to greater difficulties inhibiting the tendency to imitate (Ainley, Brass, 
& Tsakiris, 2014). Nevertheless, it seems intuitive that alexithymia may indeed be 
characterised by atypicalities with self-other control, but it is an open question as to the 
specificity of the relationship between alexithymia, interoception and self-other control 
related processing. The relationship between alexithymia and self-other control will be 
investigated in Chapter 3 of the current thesis. 
1.4.  Conclusions and Open Questions 
Thus far, behavioural and neuroscientific evidence for self-other control as a 
candidate neurocognitive mechanism for social cognition has been explored. Its involvement 
in key domains of social functioning, such as imitative control, theory of mind, perspective-
taking and empathy has been outlined, with the suggestion that the mechanism may provide a 
resolution to paradoxes of social interaction, whereby in some situations (such as imitation-
inhibition) the self must be enhanced and the other inhibited, whilst in other domains the self 
must be inhibited and the other enhanced (such as theory of mind, perspective-taking and 
empathy). Furthermore, a clear neural basis of this mechanism has been outlined in the 
context of imitation-inhibition and perspective-taking, two domains for which self-other 
control appears important. Finally, although we do not yet know the precise developmental 
trajectories for the neurocognitive deficits observed in disorders such as ASD, schizophrenia, 
and mirror touch synaesthesia, the survey of the existing literature suggests that consideration 
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of a self-other control mechanism may explain the broad sociocognitive deficits seen in these 
conditions. 
However, there are a number of outstanding questions concerning the behavioural and 
neural bases of self-other control, as well as its precise involvement in atypical as well as 
typical social cognitive functioning, which the current thesis seeks to address. First, with the 
exception of a select few studies, investigations of self-other representation to date have 
suffered from methodological issues. For example, the investigation of one’s ability to 
represent the self and the other in disorders of social cognition have often been done via 
independent tasks, and comparisons are then made at the neural level between these tasks 
(Langdon et al., 1997). Accordingly, future assessment of self-other control in disorders of 
social cognition can benefit from the now widely used task of imitative control (Figure 1) as a 
robust behavioural index, amalgamating the inspection of both self- and other-representations 
in one task. All chapters in this thesis take the approach of investigating the simultaneous 
measurement of self and other representations and this thesis seeks a greater understanding of 
whether self-other control might also explain deficits across domains of social cognition as 
well as across disorders of social cognition.  
Chapters 2 and 3 will begin by examining the prototypical index of self-other control 
(the ‘control of imitation’, ‘automatic imitation’ or ‘imitation-inhibition’ task) in relation to 
disorders of social cognition. Chapter 2 (Sowden et al., 2016a) considers the integrity of the 
Broken Mirror Theory as an explanation of social functioning deficits in autism, and whether 
ASD may be better characterised as a disorder of control or modulation of social behaviour. 
Chapter 3 (Sowden et al., 2016b) examines the specificity of any link between self-other 
control and alexithymia. Both Chapters 2 and 3 also have the capacity to shed light on the 
question of domain-generality vs domain-specificity of this mechanism in explaining 
imitative control in these disorders.  
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In order to validate self-other control as a mechanism branching across social 
domains, there is a need for more behavioural measures of self-other control which elicit 
similar demands of self-other conflict across different domains of social cognition. There is 
also an open question as to the degree to which this mechanism may extend to more high-
level social cognition. Therefore, Chapter 5 (Sowden et al., 2015), Experiment 1 discusses the 
development of a novel task to index self-other control in the context of lie detection (where 
representations here relate to the opinions of self and other which must be controlled for 
successful lie detection performance). Experiment 2 of this chapter then tests whether the lie 
detection task developed in Experiment 1 is affected by excitatory TPJ stimulation in the 
same way as other tasks assessing self-other control. If so, one can be more confident of the 
TPJ’s role in self-other control across domains of social cognition. This is preceded by 
Chapter 4 which provides an overview of the history, physiology and methodology of tDCS. 
Following these chapters, Chapter 6 further examines the integrity of self-other control in 
relation to ASD utilising the lie detection self-other control task. This chapter examines self-
other control in relation to autistic traits distributed throughout the population (Trembath & 
Vivanti, 2014). 
Finally, Chapter 7 describes the development and piloting of a novel group task to 
elicit self-other interference effects in the context of social conformity; a higher-level, group 
social process, in which the ‘other’ refers not simply to one individual but to a group of 
others. It is currently an open and important question to consider how a mechanism of self-
other control may apply to group social interaction. Moreover, there is the suggestion that 
there may exist two varieties of social influence; acceptance and compliance, with the reasons 
for social conformity here concerning whether or not one’s response in a task is private or 
public to the rest of the group. Thus, this chapter also aims to dissociate these processes 
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within the same task to afford the investigation of two types of self-other conflict within the 
same social domain.  
Chapter 7 is written with a focus on task design and methodology, with 
supplementary consideration of how self-other interference effects in the domain of 
conformity relate to population level autistic traits. This acts as a primer for future research 
using this task to further understand the neural and behavioural bases of self-other control.   
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Chapter 2. Intact automatic imitation and typical spatial compatibility in 
autism spectrum disorder: Challenging the broken mirror theory
This chapter is presented as a published article and is an exact copy of the following 
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Sowden, S.*, Koehne, S.*, Catmur, C., Dziobek, I., & Bird, G. (2016). Intact automatic 
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2.1. Supplementary Data Analysis for Chapter 2
  Analyses which were not included in the published article due to space limitations are 
presented here. In Experiment 1, no significant correlations were observed between automatic 
imitation and either ADOS (r = .100, p = .469) or AQ (r = -.087, p = .376) scores, and no 
significant correlation was observed between effector compatibility and either ADOS (r =
 -.048, p = .729) or AQ (r = -.038, p = .699) scores.
  In Experiment 2, no significant correlation was observed between AQ scores and 
either imitative compatibility (r = -.026, p = .878) or spatial compatibility (r = .307, p =
.068). Finally, no correlation was observed between the two measures of autistic trait severity
(ADOS and AQ scores) in either Experiment 1 (r = -.064, p = .643) or Experiment 2 (r = -
.265, p = .287).
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Chapter 4. Brief introduction to transcranial direct current stimulation 
and relevant methodological issues 
Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) is a non-invasive form of brain 
stimulation, which induces a constant weak electrical current in the cortex via two conductive 
rubber-coated electrodes, placed on the scalp inside saline-soaked sponges and connected to a 
battery-powered constant current stimulator. Such a weak electrical current is used to 
modulate neuronal cortical excitability and the resulting effects on behaviour and cognition 
are observed. This chapter provides an introduction to the history, physiology and 
methodological issues concerned with the use of tDCS.  
4.1.  A Brief History of tDCS 
  The use of electrical stimulation has its roots as early as 43 AD. The physician 
Scribonius Largus experimented with the use of live torpedo fish, which produce strong 
direct electrical currents, to alleviate headaches when placed on an individual’s forehead 
(Debru, 2006; Kellaway, 1946; Priori, 2003). Methods advanced during the late 18
th
 century 
with the development of the electric battery by Italian scientist Alessandro Volta, as well as 
his work with Luigi Galvani on the role of electricity and galvanic currents to induce muscle 
movement and maintain muscle physiology in animals (Parent, 2004). The development of a 
device to deliver a constant, direct electrical current prompted a body of work by Galvani’s 
nephew Giovanni Aldini in applying galvanic currents to patients suffering from melancholia, 
symbolising the first clinical applications for direct current stimulation. Without means to test 
the intensity of direct currents, Aldini experimented on himself to establish parameters which 
he then reported to be successful in alleviating symptoms in patients (Priori, 2003). However, 
there was mixed success in this work as well as with the subsequent application of direct 
current stimulation in a number of other psychiatric disorders (Lolas, 1977). Thus, the use of 
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direct current stimulation fell out of the spotlight with the rising popularity of 
electroconvulsive therapy as well as the development of drugs to target clinical disorders 
between 1930 and 1960. 
Direct current stimulation applied transcranially rose in popularity once again in the 
1960s, when researchers began to recognise the benefit of understanding the mechanisms 
behind the effects of weak, direct electrical currents on the brain (Priori, 2003). For example, 
important discoveries concerning brain physiology were made by investigating the effect of 
anodal and cathodal tDCS on cortical excitability in animals (Albert, 1966; Creutzfeldt, 
Fromm, & Kapp, 1962; Purpura & McMurtry, 1965), as well as some early findings on the 
impact of tDCS on animal and human cognition (Lippold & Redfearn, 1964; Redfearn, 
Lippold, & Costain, 1964). 
To complete a full circle of the history and popularity of electrical stimulation, much 
of our current understanding of the effects of tDCS has come from the increased use of tDCS 
as a neuroscientific tool for understanding brain and behaviour in the past two decades. Not 
only has it been studied extensively to aid understanding of human motor functions (Nitsche 
& Paulus, 2001; Priori, Berardelli, Rona, Accornero, & Manfredi, 1998), but also the 
neurocognitive mechanisms involved in various executive functions (Fregni et al., 2005; Gill, 
Shah-Basak, & Hamilton, 2015; Zaehle, Sandmann, Thorne, Jäncke, & Herrmann, 2011), 
language (Monti et al., 2013; Price, McAdams, Grossman, & Hamilton, 2015) and even 
aspects of social functioning (Sellaro, Nitsche, & Colzato, 2016, 2017). Finally, due to the 
non-invasive, painless nature of tDCS, there has been recent interest and success in the utility 
of tDCS to treat depression (Nitsche, Boggio, Fregni, & Pascual-Leone, 2009; Shiozawa et 
al., 2014) and some other clinical conditions such as stroke, Parkinson’s disease and pain-
related conditions (Borckardt et al., 2011, 2012; Demirtas-Tatlidede, Vahabzadeh-Hagh, & 
Pascual-Leone, 2013; Fregni et al., 2006; Lindenberg, Renga, Zhu, Nair, & Schlaug, 2010). 
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4.2.  Physiological Basis of tDCS 
 TDCS impacts brain function, not by inducing neuronal action potentials as is the case 
with transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), but by hyperpolarising or depolarising resting 
membrane potentials of neurons in the underlying cortex. This in turn modifies the 
spontaneous firing of these neurons (Nitsche & Paulus, 2000). This is achieved by delivering 
a sub-threshold, weak electric current (between 1 and 2 mA) to the brain, for a period of 
approximately 20 minutes, using a battery-powered constant current stimulator connected to 
two surface rubber-conducting electrodes placed on the scalp inside saline-soaked sponges 
(DaSilva, Volz, Bikson, & Fregni, 2011). One electrode is positively charged (anodal) and 
one is negatively charged (cathodal). Current is suggested to flow from the anodal to the 
cathodal electrode, through superficial cortical areas in the brain, inducing changes in 
membrane polarisation (Rozisky, Antunes, Brietzke, de Sousa, & Caumo, 2016; see Figure 1 
for visual depiction). Anodal stimulation is widely believed to cause depolarisation of 
membrane potentials, resulting in a higher probability of an action potential (excitatory 
stimulation) and cathodal stimulation should hyperpolarise membrane potentials, reducing the 
likelihood of an action potential (Ardolino, Bossi, Barbieri, & Priori, 2005; Boros, Poreisz, 
Munchau, Paulus, & Nitsche, 2008; Nitsche & Paulus, 2000). Thus, it is important to think 
about the precise location of placement of the electrodes on the scalp in order to optimise the 
desired effects on brain polarisation. 
 Changes in neuronal excitability and behaviour have been shown to persist after 
stimulation and are often demonstrated by investigating the size of motor-evoked potentials 
(MEPs) elicited by TMS (see Figure 2 for demonstration of anodal and cathodal effects on 
motor cortex excitability). This raised the question as to whether synaptic plasticity is 
involved in the after-effects of stimulation. Although the precise mechanism of these changes 
is still not fully understood, stimulation is believed to influence protein synthesis and to cause 
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changes in intracellular calcium (Ca
2+
) and sodium (Na
+
), leading to changes in 
neurotransmission (Islam, Aftabuddin, Moriwaki, Hattori, & Hori, 1995). These are 
important aspects of long-term potentiation (LTP) and long-term depression (LTD; Monte-
Silva et al., 2013) and thus, synaptic changes following tDCS have been likened to those 
involved in LTP and LTD. LTP describes the way in which connections between neurons are 
strengthened, following the Hebbian idea that ‘cells that fire together wire together’, creating 
long-lasting synaptic connections. LTD is opposite to LTP and leads to the weakening of 
synaptic connections as a result of neurons firing out of sync. LTP and LTD are considered to 
be the key processes involved in learning and memory. 
 LTP is dependent on N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) receptors and direct current 
stimulation applied to the rat motor cortex has been found to induce (Fritsch et al., 2010; 
Podda et al., 2016), as well as modulate (Ranieri et al., 2012), NMDA receptor-dependent 
LTP. The role of NMDA activity has been further confirmed using pharmacological 
intervention. The excitatory effects of anodal tDCS were prolonged following a boost in 
NMDA receptor activity using the partial agonist D-cycloserine (Nitsche et al., 2004), and the 
effects of anodal and cathodal tDCS-induced plasticity were suppressed following 
administration of the NMDA receptor blocker dextromethorphan (Liebetanz, Nitsche, 
Tergau, & Paulus, 2002; Nitsche et al., 2003a). Thus, due to the clearly important role for 
NMDA in this process, it can be assumed that tDCS induces plasticity in the glutamatergic 
system. This system is also dependent on concentrations of calcium and sodium ions in the 
postsynaptic membrane and there is a body of in vitro animal evidence of increased levels of 
these ions following anodal direct current stimulation (Islam et al., 1995), as well as 
suppression of the effects of anodal direct current stimulation following administration of 
calcium and sodium channel blockers (Liebetanz et al., 2002; Nitsche et al., 2003a). This 
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provides evidence for the effects of stimulation on resting membrane potentials, with 
increases in these ion concentrations leading to enhanced synaptic transmission. 
 In combination with this, neurotransmission is also thought to be influenced via the 
GABAergic system, whereby anodal stimulation has been shown to reduce concentrations of 
GABA, an inhibitory neurotransmitter, therefore facilitating neuroplasticity (Nitsche et al., 
2004; Stagg et al., 2009). Thus, it appears anodal stimulation acts on both glutamatergic and 
GABAergic neurotransmission in the brain, whereas cathodal simulation may act on the 
glutamatergic system. There are, however, reports of tDCS modulating dopaminergic and 
serotonergic activity and also varied effects on each of these systems depending on the 
precise regions, intensity of stimulation and neuronal cells targeted by the stimulation 
(Medeiros et al., 2012). 
 Finally, there is now evidence that tDCS may alter oscillatory activity in the 
underlying cortex, with enhanced beta and gamma oscillatory activity found in the visual 
cortex following anodal stimulation and diminished activity in these wavebands following 
cathodal stimulation (Antal, Kincses, Nitsche, Bartfai, & Paulus, 2004; Ardolino et al., 2005). 
 In conclusion, much work is still needed to fully elucidate the precise physiological 
mechanisms of action of anodal and cathodal tDCS on the brain and how these may differ as 
key stimulation parameters are altered. However, the aforementioned research does suggest 
that tDCS brings about changes in cortical excitability in the underlying cortex as well as 















Figure 1. Illustration of tDCS setup and the effects of stimulation on membrane polarisation 
following anodal and cathodal stimulation. Green arrows represent direction of current flow 











Figure 2. The time course of polarity-specific changes in motor cortex excitability for 5 
minutes immediately following 5 minutes of tDCS at 1 mA to the motor cortex. Asterisks 
indicate significant differences in MEP amplitudes between anodal and cathodal conditions. 
Taken from Nitsche and Paulus (2001). 
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4.3.  Methodological Issues 
4.3.1. Stimulation parameters.  There are a number of factors which affect the 
efficacy of tDCS, including the current intensity and density, length of stimulation, electrode 
placement, and whether the stimulation is delivered online or offline. These are important 
factors to consider to optimise the efficacy of tDCS and when interpreting results from 
studies using tDCS.  
4.3.1.1.  Stimulation intensity and electrode size.  Current density is a proportionate 
measure of the stimulation intensity to the size of the electrode used to deliver the stimulation 
and can have a bearing on the physiological and behavioural effects of tDCS. The larger the 
surface area of the electrode, the more distributed the current is across the area underneath the 
electrode. Thus, electrode size should be taken into account when deciding the intensity of 
stimulation required to the relevant brain region of interest. Typically, tDCS studies utilise 
electrodes of 5 cm X 7 cm (35 cm
2
) and deliver a current of between 1 and 2 mA, resulting in 
current densities between 0.029 and 0.086 mA/cm
2
 (Paulus, Antal, & Nitsche, 2012). 
Although the peak current density is found in the cortex directly underlying the electrodes, 
with a rapid decrease in areas immediately neighbouring these (Lang et al., 2005), the use of 
such large electrodes does contribute to the low spatial resolution inherent with the use of 
tDCS, as the focality of the stimulation is compromised. The benefit, however, of using the 
35 cm
2
 electrode as opposed to much smaller electrodes is that it reduces the risk of skin 
burns caused by electricity concentrations on the scalp underneath the electrodes 
(Furubayashi et al., 2008).    
When using 35 cm
2 
electrodes, increases in current intensity from 0.2 mA to 1 mA 
have been investigated to gauge the lowest current intensity to elicit after-effects. When 
delivered over the motor cortex, a stimulation intensity of 0.4 mA was sufficient to see 
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observable effects on MEP amplitudes (Nitsche & Paulus, 2000). Moreover, current 
intensities of 3 mA or above have been found to cause some discomfort (Furubayashi et al., 
2008). Thus, it is common safe practise across tDCS studies to utilise intensities of between 1 
and 2 mA delivered by electrodes sized between 20 and 35 cm
2
.  
4.3.1.2.  Stimulation duration.  Effects of stimulation on behaviour are relatively 
short-lived, but after-effects have been found to increase with increasing durations of 
stimulation (Nitsche & Paulus, 2000). Nitsche and Paulus (2000) investigated motor cortex 
excitability following tDCS, as indexed by the amplitude of TMS-induced MEPs. The 
shortest stimulation duration for which measurable after-effects were found was 3 minutes at 
1 mA. However, they showed a steep, non-linear increase in the duration of after-effects with 
increasing stimulation duration, with anodal tDCS for 5 minutes leading to after-effects for 
less than 5 minutes post stimulation, and stimulation for 13 minutes resulting in an over-
proportionate increase of cortical excitability for up to 120 minutes (Figure 3). There is also 
some evidence to suggest repeated sessions of anodal tDCS may lead to subtle behavioural 
changes for up to several weeks (Nitsche & Paulus, 2000, 2001; Nitsche et al., 2003b). 
However, caution should be exercised here as there are some reports that increasing 
stimulation duration from 13 to 26 minutes converts the initial excitatory effect to an 
inhibitory effect (Monte-Silva et al., 2013). Thus, it seems there is an optimum stimulation 
duration for one session tDCS to optimise behavioural after-effects. In order to prolong the 
excitatory effects of anodal stimulation past a 90-120 minute window, it has been proposed 
that an interval of roughly 24 hours is required between repeated stimulation sessions (Reis et 
al., 2009). Similar increased after-effects with increased stimulation duration have been 
observed for cathodal stimulation; as stimulation duration increased from 9 to 18 minutes, so 
did the duration of the inhibitory after-effects observed on motor cortex-elicited MEPs 












Figure 3. The time course of excitatory effects on the motor cortex (as indexed by TMS-
induced MEP amplitudes) following different durations of anodal tDCS to the motor cortex. 
With increasing stimulation duration, stimulation effects are prolonged, lasting up to 120 
minutes following 13 minutes of stimulation. Baseline excitability is represented by the 
dotted line and filled shapes represent significant changes compared to baseline. Taken from 
Nitsche and Paulus (2001). 
 
 
4.3.1.3.  Electrode positioning.  The positioning of the anodal and cathodal electrodes 
during tDCS is particularly important when considering the physiological effects on the 
brain. As we know the current passes through cortical areas from the anodal to the cathodal 
electrode, it is important to appreciate that the modulation of excitability will be distributed 
over a wider area of the brain than simply the cortical area directly below the electrodes. 
Thus, it may be important to consider how a network of brain regions may be involved in a 
particular cognitive function of interest and this should be taken into account when setting 
stimulation parameters. One way to reduce the current density delivered to the cortical area 
under the reference electrode, and to maximise stimulation power over the area of interest 
relative to the area under the reference, is to significantly increase the size of the reference 
electrode (Nitsche et al., 2007).  
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There are a variety of electrode montages which can be used in a tDCS setup. The 
electrode of interest is placed over the cortical area of interest. While in some montages the 
reference electrode may be placed on a cephalic region (usually over a cortical area 
contralateral, or posterior, to the electrode of interest), in others it is placed on an 
extracephalic region such as the shoulder or upper arm, or on the forehead (Datta, Baker, 
Bikson, & Fridriksson, 2011). To demonstrate the influence of different electrode montages 
on tDCS-induced cortical excitability; during motor cortex stimulation, only two of six 
different electrode position combinations tested were shown to modulate motor cortex 
excitability (Nitsche et al., 2008), which is suggested to be because the different position 
combinations may modulate excitability of different neuronal populations (Priori et al., 
1998). Moreover, during anodal stimulation to the motor cortex, placing the reference 
(cathodal) electrode over a cortical area contralateral to the anodal electrode resulted in 
excitatory after-effects on MEP amplitudes (Nitsche & Paulus, 2000), whereas when placed 
on the chin, inhibitory after-effects were observed (Priori et al., 1998).  
Additionally, similar differences have been observed when the primary visual cortex 
was stimulated, whereby the reference electrode placement over the vertex or on the neck 
resulted in different after-effects on visual-evoked potentials in two different studies 
(Accornero, Voti, La Riccia, & Gregori, 2007; Antal et al., 2004). Other than the placement 
of the reference electrode, the methodology of these two sets of studies were equivalent, 
highlighting the vital importance of electrode positioning in determining the effects of 
stimulation on the brain. 
Finally, Moliadze, Antal, and Paulus (2010) also demonstrated the importance of the 
distance between the two electrodes. They demonstrated that stimulation after-effects reduced 
significantly with increasing distance of the reference electrode from the anodal electrode 
during anodal stimulation to the motor cortex. In order to produce comparable after-effects 
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across each distance condition, stimulation intensity had to be adapted, with higher 
stimulation intensities required with greater distance between the anodal and reference 
electrodes. 
Thus, from this evidence we see that electrode positioning is crucial in determining 
many aspects of current flow during direct current stimulation, and therefore has a huge 
bearing on the effect of the stimulation on cortical excitability (Utz, Dimova, Oppenländer, & 
Kerkhoff, 2010). The experiment detailed in Chapter 5 of this thesis therefore utilises a tDCS 
electrode montage whereby the anodal electrode is placed over the area of interest and the 
reference (cathodal) electrode is placed over the vertex, with this montage being well 
established for the cognitive function of interest, with consistent effects on cortical 
excitability across a number of studies (Hogeveen et al., 2015; Santiesteban, Banissy, 
Catmur, & Bird, 2012, 2015).        
4.3.1.4.  Online vs. offline stimulation.  A further parameter to consider with the 
tDCS setup is the time at which stimulation is delivered. Online stimulation is delivered 
simultaneous with the completion of an experimental task, whereas offline stimulation is 
delivered prior to task completion. Studies looking to enhance learning often deliver their 
stimulation online during a learning or training experiment. For example, Nitsche et al. 
(2003b) demonstrated how applying anodal stimulation online improved learning rates during 
a motor learning task, whereas 10 minutes of offline stimulation prior to the completion of 
the same learning task had no effect on learning rates (Kuo, Paulus, & Nische, 2006). 
Stagg and colleagues (Stagg et al., 2009) compared 10 studies investigating 
stimulation over the motor cortex, 8 of which utilised online stimulation, and 2 utilising 
offline stimulation and found stronger modulation of motor cortex excitability in the online 
studies. However, when considering cognitive domains such as attention, a direct comparison 
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of performance on the same task was made between online and offline stimulation to the 
visual cortex, revealing greater facilitation in the offline condition. Commensurately, Hsu, 
Ku, Zanto, and Gazzaley (2015) presented a meta-analysis of the effects of tDCS on 
cognitive function in healthy individuals, finding offline stimulation to produce stronger 
enhancement of cognitive functioning than online stimulation. Interestingly, however, they 
found the reverse was true in individuals with Alzheimer’s disease, whereby more 
pronounced improvements of cognitive functioning were observed following online 
compared to offline stimulation. 
It appears that both online and offline designs may be successful in inducing after-
effects. However, the efficacy of online and offline stimulation may be dependent on the 
study design, including the domain and even the target population of interest, with some 
behavioural functions benefitting from one more than the other. More controlled comparisons 
of online and offline designs are required, particularly within and between various cognitive 
domains in order to elucidate the optimal time to administer tDCS to elicit desired stimulation 
effects.  
4.3.1.5.  Sham vs. active control stimulation.  Another important feature of any tDCS 
design is the use of a baseline or control stimulation condition to establish the specificity of 
the effects of stimulation, i.e. to identify whether the effects are specific to active stimulation 
(relative to a placebo effect) or specific to stimulation of a particular brain region. One 
method is to use active stimulation vs. sham (non-active) stimulation. For instance, the 
electrodes are placed at the same locations on the scalp, however, in the sham condition, the 
constant current stimulator is turned on for an initial 15-30 seconds, after which the 
stimulation ceases. This gives the initial tingling sensation experienced with active 
stimulation, making the physical experience as similar as possible between the conditions, 
and it is widely accepted that participants cannot distinguish sham and active stimulation 
101 
(Russo, Wallace, Fitzgerald, & Cooper, 2013). Despite this, there are reports of differences in 
the experience of active and sham stimulation (Kessler, Turkeltaub, Benson, & Hamilton, 
2012). Moreover, a behavioural difference observed between the after-effects of sham and 
active stimulation does not rule out the possibility that active stimulation to any other region 
of the brain might also induce the same after-effects. Thus, sham stimulation by itself does 
not make for the best control condition because of its lack of specificity in assessing the 
involvement of a particular brain region. 
Alternatively, a more experimentally rigorous control condition would involve an 
active control site whereby, for example, anodal stimulation is administered to a region of 
interest in one condition, and an area not thought to be involved in the behaviour of interest in 
another condition, whilst the reference electrode is placed over the same region in both 
conditions. Differences in after-effects found here allow conclusions to be made about the 
selective involvement of the area of interest, thus acting as a more informative control 
condition (Parkin, Ekhtiari, & Walsh, 2015). 
4.3.2.  Safety considerations.  With the current surge in the use of tDCS in both 
research and clinical settings, it is important to consider the health and safety of the 
participants when designing stimulation protocols and carrying out stimulation. TDCS is 
widely accepted to be a safe, non-invasive form of brain stimulation, with the most severe 
adverse effects being limited to a few reports of small lesions on the skin underlying the 
electrodes (Frank et al., 2010; Palm et al., 2008; Rodriguez, Opisso, Pascual-Leone, & Soler, 
2014). These were, however, reported in studies stimulating in the higher range of standard 
stimulation intensity (≥2 mA) and often from multiple sessions of stimulation.  
Other minor adverse side effects reported in both healthy and clinical populations 
include slight skin irritation or phosphenes (bright flashes of light) at the start of stimulation, 
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as well as headache, nausea, dizziness, itching or tingling sensations, and reduced 
concentration after stimulation (Brunoni et al., 2011; Nitsche et al., 2003c; Poreisz, Boros, 
Antal, & Paulus, 2007). Poreisz et al. (2007) examined side effects across a number of studies 
conducted in healthy and clinical populations, with itching sensations being the most 
commonly reported side effect in healthy participants and headaches most commonly 
reported in patients. However, in a meta-analysis of clinical trials by Brunoni and colleagues 
(Brunoni et al., 2011), the most commonly reported side effects of itching or tingling were 
reported numerically, but not statistically significantly more frequently following active than 
non-active stimulation. Brunoni and colleagues do nonetheless describe a lack of consistency 
across studies in the tendency and means of reporting adverse side effects in tDCS studies, 
thus calling for stricter guidelines to improve our understanding of the safe parameters for 
tDCS in future research and clinical settings. 
There have been also reports of current-induced tissue damage in the brains of rats 
following direct current stimulation (Liebetanz et al., 2009). However, as Nitsche et al. 
(2003c) identify, unlike some animal studies where stimulation may be applied directly to the 
brain tissue, human direct current stimulation is administered transcranially, with electrodes 
placed on the scalp and not in direct contact with the brain. Moreover, the current density 
used in this study was roughly two orders of magnitude higher than that typically used in 
human tDCS studies. Thus, it is unlikely that such adverse effects will be observed in humans 
(Nitsche & Paulus, 2011).  
Current commonly used parameters are widely tested and approved to be safe with 
minimal side effects. Accordingly, stimulation parameters are set in line with these safety 
criteria and are usually kept to a very weak current between 0.5 and 2 mA (Bikson, Datta, & 
Elwassif, 2009). Moreover, various safety measures are taken to ensure that the parameters 
are safe for each individual undergoing stimulation. This includes participants completing a 
103 
thorough screening questionnaire. As tDCS involves electricity, it is not advisable for people 
who have a pacemaker, an implanted medication pump, a metal plate in the skull or metal 
objects inside the eye or skull (e.g. after brain surgery or a shrapnel wound). The other main 
concern most commonly associated with other forms of brain stimulation, such as TMS, is 
that in rare circumstances this method has induced seizures. However, tDCS modulates 
membrane potentials rather than neuronal excitability directly and therefore there have not 
been reports of this occurring with the use of tDCS parameters within the current accepted 
safe limits (Nitsche et al., 2003c). Nevertheless, individuals susceptible to seizures (i.e. with a 
history of epilepsy) and those taking neuroleptic medication should be prevented from taking 
part in tDCS studies. 
4.3.3.  Inconsistency in cathodal effects.  It was the investigation of the effects of 
tDCS on motor function which lead to our understanding of the effects of anodal and 
cathodal stimulation on the brain. However, with the later addition of cognitive studies, these 
polarity effects have been shown not to replicate across some studies (Jacobson, Koslowsky, 
& Lavidor, 2012). These inconsistencies, however, have generally concerned cathodal 
stimulation showing effects on motor function but little or no observable effects on cognitive 
function, whereas behavioural effects of anodal stimulation appear to be consistently 
excitatory across both motor and cognitive domains. It is worth noting, however, that 
although the effects of cathodal stimulation may not be observable on behaviour, this does 
not rule out the possibility that it is having an inhibitory effect at the physiological and 
molecular level. Moreover, cathodal effects may be more complicated than those of anodal 
stimulation. For example, decreasing neuronal excitability in some regions of the brain during 
certain cognitive tasks may reduce neuronal competition and thus improve performance in 
some domains.  
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Neuronal excitability in areas performing various cognitive functioning is also not 
expected to be at zero prior to tDCS, and thus stimulation is being applied to an already 
active cortex (Silvanto, Muggleton, & Walsh, 2008). Therefore, cathodal effects on neuronal 
excitability may be more difficult to find, or may be smaller in magnitude, than those due to 
anodal stimulation. Anodal stimulation simply increases the already high neuronal 
excitability, whereas cathodal stimulation may need to be significantly greater in order to 
produce comparable inhibitory effects on excitability (Jacobson et al., 2012). In comparison, 
however, the motor cortex is thought to be less active at rest which might explain the more 
equivalent magnitudes of effects of anodal and cathodal stimulation on motor cortex activity 
but not on cognitive function. 
Thus, a straightforward comparison of anodal and cathodal effects, as well as 
inferring neuronal excitability from cognitive performance may not be possible. It is 
important to establish how anodal and cathodal stimulation affects domains of behaviour 
differentially, and using well-researched stimulation parameters will allow for more concrete 
conclusions to be drawn from the results of tDCS studies. Consequently, in Chapter 5 of this 
thesis, the stimulation parameters have been set in line with those from previous studies 
investigating the role of the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) in self-other control processes 
(Hogeveen et al., 2015; Santiesteban et al., 2012, 2015). Crucially these studies showed 
excitatory effects on the behaviour of interest when the anodal electrode was placed over the 
TPJ, but not when placed over a mid-occipital control region (with the reference, cathodal 
electrode over the vertex), but no effects on behaviour when either sham stimulation was 
administered or when the cathodal electrode was placed over the TPJ (with the reference, 
anodal electrode placed over the vertex). Thus, the tDCS parameters described in Chapter 5 
based on this previous research, allow a prediction as to the direction and specificity of the 
behavioural effects expected if self-other control recruits the TPJ.  
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4.3.4. Inconsistency in the neurophysiological and behavioural effects of tDCS.  
Recently, the reliability and replicability of experimental findings within psychology have 
been called into question and this is also a growing concern in the area of neurostimulation, 
with the specific suggestion that tDCS effects are inconsistent and unreliable. It is now 
common to take a more meta-analytical approach to the study of the effects of tDCS on brain 
and cognition with the aim of revealing whether findings are consistent and reliable across 
stimulation parameters, cognitive domains and participant populations. For example, meta-
analyses have been carried out across the whole spectrum of applications for tDCS, such as in 
modulating specific cognitive functions (Brunoni & Vanderhasselt, 2014; Hill, Fitzgerald, & 
Hoy, 2016; Kang, Summers, & Cauraugh, 2016; Khalighinejad, Di Costa, & Haggard, 2016; 
Price et al., 2015); in treating symptoms of specific clinical conditions (Berlim, Van den 
Eynde, & Daskalakis, 2013; Brunoni et al., 2016; Butler et al., 2013; Meron, Hedger, Garner, 
& Baldwin, 2015; Shiozawa et al., 2014); as well as meta-analyses of stimulation to specific 
brain regions (Dedoncker, Brunoni, Baeken, & Vanderhasselt, 2016; Donaldson, Rinehart, & 
Enticott, 2015); reviews to categorise the effects of different electrode montages (Nasseri, 
Nitsche, & Ekhtari, 2015), and finally reviews to try to find common effects of all variations 
of tDCS parameters across all behavioural outcomes (Horvath, Forte, & Carter, 2015a; 
Summers, Kang, & Cauraugh, 2016) and neurophysiological effects (Horvath, Forte, & 
Carter, 2015b; Medeiros et al., 2012). 
Despite general consistency between findings in a number of these meta-analyses, a 
handful revealed mixed or no consistent results for the effect of tDCS on the brain and 
behaviour (Horvath et al., 2015a, 2015b). However, it has been suggested that a reason for 
such a mixed picture of the effects of tDCS, and the problem of comparing all studies 
directly, is the issue of the heterogeneity of the experimental protocols (Donaldson et al., 
2015; Shiozawa et al., 2014). For instance, the more the meta-analysis collapses across 
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cognitive domains, brain regions, electrode montages and various other stimulation 
parameters, the more mixed the results are likely to be (Price & Hamilton, 2015). Those 
studies taking a more specific investigation of one facet of stimulation, such as a specific 
brain region, cognitive function or stimulation parameter (e.g. electrode montage, stimulation 
intensity or timing of stimulation), indeed find more consistent stimulation results (Brunoni 
& Vanderhasselt, 2014; Donaldson et al., 2015; Kang et al., 2016; Price et al., 2015; Sellaro 
et al., 2017). 
Particularly, Horvath and colleagues argue for no reliable neurophysiological 
(Horvath et al, 2015b) or cognitive (Horvath et al., 2015a) effects of tDCS. However, it has 
since been argued that the methods of these meta-analyses were themselves questionable, 
with problems in their data selection and statistical approach used, as well as the methods of 
many studies being mischaracterised for the sake of grouping studies into arbitrary cognitive 
domains (Price & Hamilton, 2015). Additionally, experts in the field (Nitsche, Bikson, & 
Bestmann, 2015) have commented that meta-analyses aiming to find a binary conclusion of 
what direct current stimulation does to the brain and behaviour, or whether or not it ‘works’, 
are miscalibrated to the current state of the field. We know that a number of factors affect the 
expected effects of direct current stimulation on brain excitability and behaviour, including 
current intensity, electrode size, the cognitive function being investigated and probably most 
importantly, the electrode positioning and montage of the two electrodes. Thus, although 
large scale meta-analyses are preferable and improve power to detect effects, a more realistic 
place to begin is with straight forward replications as well as more systematic choice of 
parameters and data analyses where factors influencing stimulation effects are identified and 
controlled. This will allow for future establishment of more reliable, consistent and targeted 
stimulation from which our understanding of the physiological and behavioural mechanisms 
will be improved.  
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Finally, an important consideration in determining the reliability of the 
neurophysiological and behavioural effects of brain stimulation is the presence of publication 
bias. This can be explained as the outcome of an experiment having an impact on whether the 
research is published in an academic journal. Publication bias is generally seen via a positive 
bias to publish only results which are significant and may be introduced by the experimenter 
failing to publish negative findings or academic journals accepting more manuscripts 
presenting positive than negative findings (Dickersin, 1990). This presents a problem for the 
progression of science, as negative findings are as important in advancing knowledge and 
understanding as positive findings, but are significantly underrepresented in academic 
journals (Jooper, Schmitz, Annable, & Boksa, 2012). The problem of positive publication 
bias is reported to be a particular issue in the field of neurostimulation. For example, Héroux, 
Loo, Taylor, & Gandevia (2017) recently demonstrated that 154 researchers (from an invited 
976) utilising brain stimulation in their research have a median of 3 published brain 
stimulation studies and 2 unpublished, whilst only 45-50% reported being able to routinely 
reproduce published results. 
However, the introduction of pre-registration of scientific protocols and subsequent 
publication regardless of the direction of the findings, as well as the development of methods 
to account for publication bias in meta-analyses of existing published research (Duval & 
Tweedie, 2000; Peters, Sutton, Jones, Abrams, & Rushton, 2006) can help to alleviate these 
concerns in the future. This is particularly important in the field of neurostimulation, in which 
publication of null findings is fundamental to advancing our understanding of the precise 
effects of each form of stimulation on the brain and cognition. 
4.3.5.  Individual differences.  Finally, an important issue to consider in evaluating 
the consistency of effects of tDCS is individual differences both between and within 
individuals in their response to tDCS (Chew, Ho, & Loo, 2015; Fertonani & Miniussi, 2017; 
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Krause & Cohen Kadosh, 2014). For example, individual differences in cortical excitability 
may contribute to differing effects of stimulation, and these can vary according to factors 
such as age and gender between participants but also pre-existing brain states and hormone 
levels within individuals (Falkenberg, Westerhausen, Specht, & Hugdahl, 2012; Krause & 
Cohen Kadosh, 2014). Some factors have even been shown to reverse the polarity of 
stimulation effects (Hsu, Juan, & Tseng, 2016; Krause, Márquez-Ruiz, & Cohen Kadosh 
2013). For example, Krause and colleagues (Krause et al., 2013) demonstrated that vastly 
different effects of anodal tDCS may be found between individuals with high or low regional 
excitability or even between brain regions within the same individual with high or low 
regional excitability. The effects of stimulation on any one individual have however, been 
reported to be stable across testing sessions (López-Alonso, Fernández-del-Olmo, Costantini, 
Gonzalez-Henriquez, & Cheeran, 2015). 
It has been suggested that across a spectrum of levels of regional excitability, 
stimulation effects (excitatory or inhibitory) may follow an inverted U-shaped pattern, 
whereby there is an optimum level of excitability to maximise the effect of stimulation. Thus, 
it may be possible, and perhaps more informative to our understanding, to split a sample into 
‘responders’ and ‘non-responders’ and to investigate the factors which influence this (López-
Alonso, Cheeran, Río-Rodríguez, & Fernández-Del-Olmo, 2014). It may also be crucial in 
future studies to take a more individual differences approach to effects of stimulation across 
an experiment, rather than examining grand averages of physiological and behavioural effects 
of stimulation for each person. This is demonstrated by Hamada, Murase, Hasan, Balaratnam, 
and Rothwell (2013), who tracked the patterns of MEP amplitudes in their participants across 
8 time points during an experiment. Participants were highly variable but showed definite 
physiological effects of the stimulation, which were lost when amplitudes were averaged 
across time points.  
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4.4.  Conclusions 
 TDCS has an extensive and varied history in its development and uses in research and 
clinical practice, providing some of the best understanding we have to date regarding brain 
physiology investigated in a causal manner, but without long-lasting damage to the brain.  
Despite the recent, potentially miscalibrated, discussion regarding a binary conclusion for 
what tDCS does to the brain and behaviour, it seems clear that tDCS has huge potential to 
reveal the complexities of the functioning of the human brain. For example, the number of 
stimulation parameters which can be manipulated with tDCS, including electrode placement 
montages, timing, frequency and intensity of stimulation and the behavioural outcome of 
interest allow researchers to design very specific stimulation protocols to probe at highly-
specialised questions about brain function. There is still much work to be done to fully 
elucidate the precise effects of varying each stimulation parameter at a physiological and 
behavioural level. These include the use of more evidence-based, rigorously controlled 
protocols, replication studies to establish reliable and consistent protocols, as well as well-
categorised meta-analytic investigations of each cognitive function and different 
combinations of stimulation parameters. 
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Chapter 6. The impact of autistic traits on the ability to control competing 
representations of self and other’s opinions. 
As discussed in Chapter 2 of the current thesis, Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is 
increasingly considered as a disorder of top-down control or modulation of social behaviour 
(Cook, Barbalat, & Blakemore, 2012; Wang & Hamilton, 2012). This chapter considers self-
other control as a candidate mechanism to explain impairments in social behaviour in these 
individuals. A group of neurotypical individuals and a group of individuals with a clinical 
diagnosis of ASD completed the newly developed lie detection task described in Chapter 5 
(Sowden, Wright, Banissy, Catmur, & Bird, 2015) as an index of self-other control, probing 
its relationship with autistic trait severity.  
6.1.  Introduction 
6.1.1.  A theory for the social deficits in ASD.  Despite early support for the theory 
that a dysfunctional mirror neuron system may account for the broad social deficits observed 
in ASD (Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006; Williams et al., 2006), there is now an increasingly large 
body of research which does not support this theory (Hamilton, 2013; Southgate & Hamilton, 
2008; Sowden, Koehne, Catmur, Dziobek, & Bird, 2016a). Under the ‘broken mirror’ 
account, automatic imitation, as a behavioural index of mirror neuron system function, should 
be reduced in ASD (Williams, Whiten, & Singh, 2004; Williams, Whiten, Suddendorf, & 
Perrett, 2001). However, a number of studies report intact, and even hyper-imitative 
behaviour in these individuals (Bird, Leighton, Press, & Heyes, 2007; Grossi, Marcone, 
Cinquegrana, & Gallucci, 2012; Schunke et al., 2016; Sowden, et al., 2016a; Spengler, Bird, 
& Brass, 2010a). This is consistent with clinical symptoms of echolalia and echopraxia (the 
involuntary copying of the speech and actions of others) in ASD (Grossi et al., 2012).  
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Consequently, an alternative theory was proposed, in line with reports of enhanced 
imitative behaviour in ASD as well as impairments in various other domains key for social 
functioning. This states that individuals with autism may be compromised in their ability to 
control or modulate their social behaviour (Cook et al., 2012; Sowden & Shah, 2014; Wang 
& Hamilton, 2012). For example, individuals with ASD fail to show the typical modulatory 
effects of social priming on their imitative behaviour (Cook & Bird, 2012), whilst also 
showing high correlations between hyperimitation and deficits in theory of mind (Spengler et 
al., 2010a). Social impairments are correlated across domains in ASD (Spengler et al., 2010a; 
Spengler, von Cramon, & Brass, 2009, 2010b), and a deficiency within a neural network 
which supports the top-down control of representations of ‘self’ and ‘other’ seems plausible 
to account for such a behavioural profile (Brass, Derrfuss, & von Cramon, 2005; Brass, 
Ruby, & Spengler, 2009; Sowden & Shah, 2014).  
Such ‘self-other control’ is characterised as the ability to control, or switch between, 
competing representations held for the self and for others with whom one interacts. This is 
fundamental to many aspects of social cognition. For example, to successfully take another 
person’s perspective, representation of one’s own perspective must be inhibited, and 
representation of the other person’s perspective enhanced. Similarly, to pass a theory of mind 
task one must represent the beliefs, desires, or intentions of another person whilst inhibiting 
one’s own beliefs, desires, and intentions. Likewise, when empathising with another person, 
the affective state that results from representation of the other’s emotions must be 
distinguished from one’s own (Singer & Lamm 2009). Finally, the control of imitation (also 
referred to as imitation-inhibition) requires one to switch between motor representations 
activated by the observation of another’s action and self-generated motor representations 
(Brass et al. 2009). This mechanism of self-other control is able to explain correlated 
performance across tasks in which self- and other-representations are likely to be co-activated 
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and must be selected between (Spengler et al., 2009, 2010a, 2010b), as well as behavioural 
training induced transfer effects (de Guzman, Bird, Banissy, & Catmur, 2016; Santiesteban et 
al., 2012a) between these tasks, and brain stimulation induced improvement across tasks 
which require inhibition and enhancement of self or other representations (Hogeveen et al., 
2015; Santiesteban, Banissy, Catmur, & Bird, 2012b; 2015).  
Given this body of evidence, it is possible that impaired self-other control may 
explain the reduced top-down modulation of behaviour commonly observed in ASD. This 
idea was first introduced in Chapter 2 of this thesis, which demonstrated that poorer self-
other control (as indexed by a decreased ability to control imitative response tendencies and 
thus increased imitation) is associated with increased symptom severity in individuals with 
ASD. 
The present study, however, aimed to move beyond the use of the ‘imitation-
inhibition’ or ‘control of imitation’ task to investigate whether an impairment of self-other 
control can explain performance in other social domains in ASD. Accordingly, a task was 
developed which could elicit self-other interference effects and be amenable to modulation 
via non-invasive brain stimulation, in a similar nature to the imitation-inhibition task. Rather 
than manipulating the congruence of self- and other-related motoric representations, this task 
manipulates the congruency of the opinions of the self and others in the context of lie 
detection. The task allows lie detection performance to be assessed under situations of 
opinion consistency as well as inconsistency between the self and others. See Chapter 5 
(Sowden et al., 2015) for a full outline of the theoretical development and validation of this 
task as a suitable measure of self-other control.  
6.1.2.  Control of the opinions of self and other.  It is consistently reported that 
humans perform only slightly better than chance in detecting lies, with accuracy reported at 
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54% (with a measurement corrected SD of 0.8%) across all experimental lie detection studies 
(Bond & Depaulo, 2008). There has been little success in identifying factors which might 
influence this ability. However, Sowden et al. (2015), utilising a newly developed video-
mediated lie detection task, presented one factor which appears to modulate one’s ability to 
judge the veracity of other individuals’ opinion statements: (in)consistency between the 
opinion of the self and others. 
In a similar way to the imitation-inhibition task – where inconsistency between one’s 
own motor plan and that of the other interferes with performance (Brass, Bekkering, 
Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000) – inconsistency between the opinions of the self and others 
was found to interfere with veracity judgements, decreasing accuracy in such situations to 
51%. When opinions were consistent between the self and the other accuracy was at 55%. 
Thus, it appears that self-other interference effects, observed across a range of social 
cognitive abilities (Brass et al., 2009; Santiesteban et al., 2012a), are also present in the 
context of lie detection, whereby self-other control may be required to overcome a conflict of 
opinion and allow successful performance. For example, if an individual expresses an 
opposing opinion to your own regarding euthanasia, one must inhibit representation of one’s 
own opinion on euthanasia and enhance representation of the opinion being expressed by the 
other person in order to successfully judge the veracity of their opinion statement. 
Interestingly, work by Stel and colleagues (Stel, va Dijk, & Olivier, 2009) ratifies the link 
between lie detection performance and the control of competing representations of the self 
and other. Individuals with a greater ability to inhibit imitation (i.e. improved self-other 
control) performed better when assessing the veracity of emotional expressions made by 
another individual. 
 Notably, Sowden et al. (2015) provide further support for the video-mediated lie 
detection task being considered as a task to index self-other control, with the use of non-
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invasive transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS). This study demonstrated an 
improvement in lie detection performance selectively under situations of self-other opinion 
inconsistency after utilising the same protocol of excitatory tDCS to the right temporoparietal 
junction as used to investigate self-other control in imitation-inhibition, perspective-taking 
and theory of mind (Hogeveen et al., 2015; Santiesteban et al., 2012b, 2015). 
Therefore, the current study sought to extend investigation of the integrity of self-
other control in ASD by considering lie detection; a social domain requiring the online 
representation and control of competing representations of self and other. It was predicted 
that both individuals with ASD and a matched Control group would show significant 
consistency effects (higher veracity judgement accuracy during opinion-consistent than 
opinion-inconsistent situations). A group difference in the size of these consistency effects 
was also hypothesised, whereby individuals with ASD, in line with the hypothesis of reduced 
self-other control in this population, may show larger consistency effects than their 
neurotypical counterparts, as well as increasing consistency effects with increasing autistic 
trait severity across the whole sample. 
6.2.  Materials and Methods 
6.2.1.  Participants.  Twenty-one high-functioning individuals with a clinical 
diagnosis of ASD (4 female; mean age = 35.2 years, SD = 11.2) and an age, gender and IQ-
matched sample of 39 healthy Control individuals (10 female; mean age = 35.2 years, SD = 
12.2) were recruited from a database held at the Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College 
London. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All individuals in the 
ASD group had an existing, independent, clinical diagnosis of autism or ASD according to 
DSM-IV criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 1994), which was confirmed with the 
Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord et al., 2000). 
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Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & 
Clubley, 2001) scores were significantly higher [t(58) = 11.7, p < .001] in the ASD group 
(mean = 37.1, SD = 7.5) than Control group (mean = 16.3, SD = 6.0), and the groups did not 
differ significantly in age [t(58) = 0.01, p = .990], proportion of females [χ2(1) = .33, p = 
.565], or IQ [t(58) = 0.11, p = .911]. Full sample characteristics are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1   
Participant Characteristics.  
 
NB. Values in brackets represent standard deviation from the mean. 
 
6.2.2.  Experimental procedure.  Participants completed the Opinion Questionnaire 
(Sowden et al., 2015), AQ and Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; Bagby, Parker, & 
Taylor, 1994), followed by a video-mediated lie detection task (as outlined in Chapter 5 of 
this thesis; Sowden et al., 2015) as a behavioural measure of self-other control concerning the 
opinions of the self and others. 
6.2.2.1.  Opinion Questionnaire.  The Opinion Questionnaire (see Appendix A) 
requires the participant to rate the degree to which they are for or against a number of topics 
on a 6-point scale (with an answer of ‘1’ demonstrating they are strongly for, and ‘6’ strongly 
 
ASD Control 
N 21 39 
Gender 17 Male, 4 Female 29 Male, 10 Female 
Mean Age (years) 35.2 (11.2) 35.2 (12.2) 
Mean Full-scale IQ 109.9 (16.0) 110.3 (13.0) 
Mean AQ 37.1 (7.5) 16.3 (6.0) 
ADOS Classification  11 Autism, 10 Autism Spectrum n/a 
Mean ADOS-G Score 10.2 (2.3) n/a 
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against, the topic). A total of 20 topics are asked about, with example items on the 
questionnaire including ‘medical abortion’, ‘euthanasia’, ‘stem cell research’, and ‘animal 
testing’. Responses for each item were dichotomised for later data analysis as either ‘for’ 
(responses 1-3) or ‘against’ (responses 4-6). This dichotomisation was completed to account 
for individual differences in the use of the extremities of the rating scale. 
6.2.2.2.  Autism Spectrum Quotient.  All participants completed the AQ (see 
Appendix B), a 50-item self-report questionnaire designed to assess severity of autistic-like 
traits both in the atypical and general population. Although the AQ was not designed as a 
diagnostic tool, it is frequently used to screen typical participants for autistic traits (Hurst, 
Mitchell, Kimbrel, Kwapil, & Nelson-Gray, 2007). An overall score indicative of the level of 
‘autistic-like traits’ was calculated in this study for use in data analysis. 
6.2.2.3.  Toronto Alexithymia Scale.  The Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; see 
Appendix C) is a 20-item self-report measure of an individual’s ability to identify, describe 
and experience one’s own emotions. Reponses are made on a 5-point Likert scale, from 1 
(‘does not describe me well’) to 5 (‘describes me very well’). An overall score for the level of 
‘alexithymic traits’ was derived from this questionnaire for use in data analysis. 
6.2.2.4.  Lie detection task.  The lie detection task involved watching a series of 80 
randomly-ordered video clips of individuals (‘Senders’) expressing their views, as well as a 
brief justification for their view, on the same topics included in the Opinion Questionnaire. 
Example dialogue from a trial is “I am in favour of euthanasia because everyone deserves a 
chance to die with dignity.” Following each video, participants rated whether they thought 
the Sender had presented their true opinion, or had lied about their opinion, on a 6-point scale 
(Definitely True – Definitely Lie; see Figure 1). The task took a total of 25 minutes. 
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The stimulus set comprised 40 truthful and 40 deceptive statements, conveyed by 20 
different individuals (10 males and 10 females). 4 video statements were observed for each of 
the 20 topics contained in the Opinion Questionnaire: 2 truths and 2 lies; and in a fully-
factorial design, 2 statements were spoken in agreement and 2 in disagreement with each 
topic. The videos were recorded during a previous experiment and were all provided by 
individuals who had strong opinions for or against each topic (ratings of ‘1’ or ‘6’ on the 











Figure 1. Example of on-screen display during the video-mediated lie detection task, showing 
a Sender presenting their opinion on a topic and the scale with which participants are required 
to rate the veracity of each video statement heard. Full permission was gained for the use of 
this image. 
 
6.3.  Results 
Trials were divided into opinion-consistent and opinion-inconsistent trials on a trial-
by-trial basis according to the Sender’s expressed opinion, and the participant’s opinion as 
reported on the Opinion Questionnaire. For example, if a participant expressed agreement 
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with a topic, a trial in which the Sender also expressed agreement with the topic was classed 
as an opinion-consistent trial, whereas a trial in which the Sender expressed their 
disagreement with the topic was classed as an opinion-inconsistent trial. Participants’ 
responses on each trial were dichotomised as either a ‘truth’ (responses 1-3) or a ‘lie’ 
judgment (responses 4-6), again to account for individual differences in the use of the 
extremities of the rating scale. Percentage accuracy of judgments constituted the measure of 
lie detection performance and an individual’s opinion consistency effect, as a specific type of 
self-other interference effect, was calculated as lie detection performance accuracy on 
opinion-consistent minus opinion-inconsistent trials, with smaller consistency effects 
indicating improved self-other control (i.e less impact on lie detection performance due to 
opinion inconsistency).  
Data (shown in Figure 2) were analysed using a mixed effect two-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA), with opinion consistency as the within-subjects factor and group (ASD 
or Control) as the between-subjects factor. These analyses revealed a significant 
group*consistency interaction under our one-tailed hypothesis (F(1,58) = 3.03, p = .044, ηp2= 
.05). The main effect of opinion consistency approached, but did not reach, significance 
under our one-tailed hypothesis (F(1,58) = 2.37, p = .065, ηp2= .04). Examining the 
consistency effects separately in the two groups revealed a trend towards a significant 
consistency effect in the ASD group when using the one-tailed significance value (t(20) = 
1.71, p = .052, d = 0.66), whereby accuracy was increased during opinion-consistent trials 
(mean = 57.3%, standard error of the mean [SEM] = 1.7%) relative to opinion-inconsistent 
trials (mean = 51.9%, SEM = 1.8%). The failure to achieve standard significance levels was 
perhaps unsurprising given that the experiment was underpowered to detect an effect of size 
similar to that found in Sowden et al., (2015), with power calculations indicating a required 
sample size of 40 participants. Data collection was restricted to the number of individuals 
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with ASD available to take part during the data collection period. However, a medium effect 
size was observed here. A consistency effect was not observed in the Control group at a one-
tailed significance value (t(38) = 0.192, p = .424; opinion-consistent performance mean = 



















Figure 2. Percentage accuracy when the veracity of opinion statements consistent and 
inconsistent with the participant’s own opinion was judged. The data presented are from the 
ASD and Control groups separately and error bars represent the standard error of the mean.  
 
The presence of a significant group*consistency interaction in the ANOVA merits 
further investigation of the relationship between autistic traits and opinion consistency 































Opinion consistent Opinion inconsistent
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3a) between lie detection opinion consistency (consistent – inconsistent trial performance 
accuracy) and autistic traits, as measured by the AQ (r = .433, p = .001). Interestingly, this 
relationship was observed to be significant in both the ASD (r = .436, p = .048) and Control 
(r = .488, p = .002) groups independently (Figure 3b and 3c). No relationship was found 
between ADOS and AQ scores or between ADOS severity scores and opinion consistency in 
the ASD group (ps > .05). 
Consistent with the well-established relationship between alexithymia and 
autism/autistic-like traits (Aaron et al., 2015), AQ and TAS-20 scores were highly correlated 
in the current sample (r = .701, p < .001). Moreover, there is now a body of research to 
suggest that both alexithymia (Bird & Cook, 2013; Quattrocki & Friston, 2014; Sowden, 
Brewer, Catmur, & Bird, 2016b) and demographic variables such as age, gender and IQ 
(Harms et al., 2010) are associated with performance in social cognitive tasks. Thus, 
regression analyses were conducted to test whether autistic traits account for variance over 
and above that explained by these other factors.  
 A hierarchical regression was conducted to model the variance in the size of the 
opinion consistency effect. Age, gender, IQ and TAS-20 scores were entered into the first 
step of the regression model. The first level model of the regression was not significant (p = 
.196) and neither were any of the variables included independent predictors of opinion 
consistency effects (ps > .05). AQ scores were entered into the second step of the model and 
revealed AQ scores to be a significant predictor of opinion consistency effects (β = 0.69, 
t(58) = 3.91, p < .001), over and above the other variables included in the model. The 
addition of AQ scores significantly improved the fit of the model, increasing the variance 
accounted for by 23.6% (F(1,54) = 15.32, p < .001), compared to 3.7% accounted for by the 











Figure 3. Scatterplots of the correlations between opinion consistency effects (opinion-
consistent percent accuracy - opinion-inconsistent percent accuracy) and AQ scores in (a) the 
full sample, (b) the Control group and (c) the ASD group.  
c) ASD b) Control 
a) Full sample 
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6.4.  Discussion 
 The current study sought to investigate the integrity of self-other control in ASD in 
the context of lie detection as a newly-developed index of self-other control. This was 
achieved by comparing lie detection performance under situations of consistency and 
inconsistency between the opinions of the self and others. It was theorised that impaired self-
other control would lead to a greater opinion consistency effect, whereby lie detection 
accuracy would decrease to a greater extent with opinion inconsistency. Such self-other 
interference effects in the context of opinions and lie detection have been found previously 
(Sowden et al., 2015), and are thought to be analogous to those observed in other social 
domains such as imitation-inhibition, perspective-taking and empathy (de Guzman et al., 
2016; Santiesteban et al., 2012a).   
Despite a trend towards a significant consistency effect in the predicted direction in 
the ASD group, whereby performance accuracy was higher in opinion-consistent relative to 
inconsistent trials, there was an absence of a consistency effect in the Control group. Thus, 
this study presents a failure to replicate the original consistency effect as found by Sowden et 
al. (2015). It should be noted however, that the current study was underpowered to detect 
effect sizes of the magnitude reported in Sowden et al. (2015). In contrast, and in line with 
predictions, the consistency effect was significantly associated with autistic traits across the 
whole spectrum of autistic traits; as AQ scores increased, so did the consistency effect in the 
video-mediated lie detection task. This was found in the current study in two independent 
samples; one sample of individuals with a clinical diagnosis of ASD and one sample of 
healthy Control individuals.  
In conclusion, a number of factors support further larger scale investigation of self-
other control as a candidate mechanism to explain performance across social domains in 
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ASD. There is a need to move towards a more dimensional approach in our investigation of 
cognition and behavioural functioning in autism (Landa & Goldberg, 2005) and indeed 
performance deficits are shown to correlate across social domains (Spengler et al., 2009, 
2010a, 2010b) as well as correlating with autism trait severity (Sowden et al., 2016a). 
Moreover, despite the lack of an overall consistency effect in the present Control group, a 
significant and reliable relationship was identified here between AQ scores and the opinion 
consistency effect. Together, this body of evidence provides a starting point for considering 
the therapeutic use of domain-general training in self-other control in individuals with ASD 
and perhaps even across other disorders of social cognition such as schizophrenia which are 
associated with a similar pattern of impairments.  
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Chapter 7. Quantifying compliance and acceptance through public and 
private social conformity 
Social conformity refers to a general class of social influence whereby exposure to the 
attitudes and beliefs of a group causes an individual to alter their own attitudes and behaviour 
to be more similar to those of the group. Thus, we see another candidate domain for self-other 
performance interference effects in the context of higher-level group social interaction. This 
chapter describes the development and pilot of a novel task to measure two varieties of social 
influence (acceptance and compliance); one which occurs when the participant is required to 
respond in private and one when responding publicly to a group of others. The chapter is 
written from a methodological standpoint, with a focus on dissociating two varieties of social 
conformity, and thus two levels of self-other interference effects, within the same task. 
However, with respect to the current thesis, supplementary data show how such self-other 
interference effects relate to population level autistic traits, as a primer for future research 
using this task to further understand the neural and behavioural bases of self-other control. 
7.1.  Introduction 
The multitude of ways in which the behaviour and attitudes of others impact our own 
has been studied since the very inception of psychology (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). A 
particular focus has been the study of how groups influence the behaviour of the individual, 
with studies such as those of Asch on social conformity (Asch, 1951, 1955, 1956), some of 
the most well-known in the field. In these studies, participants were asked to complete a 
simple perceptual task (judging the length of lines) in a group setting where, unbeknown to 
the participant, the other members of the group were confederates of the experimenter. 
During critical trials, despite the task having an obvious answer, the confederates all gave the 
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incorrect answer. Only a quarter of participants remained completely independent of the 
majority, with the rest showing various degrees of conformity towards the group’s responses. 
Subsequent work has identified various types of group influence, individuated by 
factors including the circumstances of the influence (e.g. whether the group pressure is 
explicit or implicit), and the nature of the change brought about in the individual. With 
respect to the latter, of interest to the current study is the distinction between compliance and 
acceptance (Kelman, 1958; Nail, Di Domenico, & MacDonald, 2013). Compliance and 
acceptance can be distinguished based on the type of attitude change brought about by the 
social influence. Compliance occurs when the individual publicly agrees with the group but 
does not change their own attitude or belief, whereas acceptance occurs when the social 
influence causes the individual to internalise the belief or attitude expressed by the group 
such that it becomes their own. Compliance and acceptance are thought to arise primarily 
from normative and informational influence, respectively (Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, 
Hogg, & Turner, 1990; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Normative influence occurs due to the 
desire of individuals to be accepted by the group, or at least not to be in conflict with the 
group. Abrams et al. (1990) suggest that “compliance with the demands and expectations of 
other group members and overt agreement with their views occurs because of their power to 
reward, punish, accept or reject individual members.” In contrast, informational influence is 
thought to result in acceptance because it occurs when individuals look to others for evidence 
as to the state of the world. As such, its effects are thought to be maximal when the state of 
the world is ambiguous, or when the individual is uncertain about a decision or judgement 
(Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). 
Although it is commonly accepted that both types of social influence are typical in 
everyday social situations, social conformity effects obtained using the Asch paradigm are 
usually attributed to normative influence (compliance) only (e.g. Allen, 1965, 1975; Bond & 
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Smith, 1996; Turner, 1991). The fact that the perceptual decision task has an obviously 
correct answer (participants almost never make errors during trials where confederates give 
the correct answer) is usually taken as prima facie evidence that results occur due to 
compliance to the group decision through normative influence. This view is not universally 
accepted however (e.g. Abrams et al., 1990; Turner, 1985), and claims of an informational 
influence are supported by a handful of studies that have compared levels of conformity using 
this task between groups of individuals who must respond publicly, and those who have the 
opportunity to make their responses in private. 
The logic of these experiments is that, by comparing individuals who give their 
responses in public with those who respond in private, the relative contributions of normative 
and informational influence (and hence compliance versus acceptance) can be established. 
Individuals who respond in private should experience little to no normative influence due to 
the fact that the group members are unaware if they have conformed or not, and thus any 
group influence should be due to informational influence alone. Comparison of the degree of 
social conformity in the private and public groups therefore allows the existence of normative 
and informational influence to be established using the standard Asch paradigm. 
Results of studies which have compared public and private conformity effects support 
the existence of an informational effect in the Asch paradigm as well as a normative effect. 
For example, Asch (1956; Experiment 4) found that rates of conformity (the percentage of 
critical trials across all participants in which errors in the direction of the confederates’ 
judgements were made) dropped from 43% in public conditions to 12.5% in private 
conditions – demonstrating a substantial normative influence effect. However, the 12.5% 
conformity rate in the private conformity condition was higher than the 1% error rate 
observed in control groups who were not subject to group pressure to give incorrect answers. 
This indicates the presence of an informational influence albeit of smaller magnitude than 
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that of the normative influence. Abrams et al. (1990) reached a similar conclusion, noting that 
participants conformed on an average of 58% of trials when asked to respond publicly, but 
only 33% when responding privately (see also Deutsch & Gerard, 1955, who reported a 16% 
drop in conformity using a privacy manipulation). 
While it is logically coherent to compare public and private responses to identify the 
relative contribution of normative and informational influence in the Asch paradigm, the 
current implementation of this comparison can be improved. Thus far, the manipulation of 
public and private responses has been between groups: the public group make their responses 
as per the original paradigm, whereas in the private group, although the confederates give 
their responses publicly, the participant responds in private. Groups of participants who 
respond publicly are then compared with those who respond in private. One issue with this 
approach is that comparisons between groups have the potential to be affected by sampling 
error and do not account for subject-level variance; this means that between-subject 
comparisons are always less sensitive than within-subjects comparisons. This loss of 
sensitivity is especially important when using techniques with a low signal-to-noise ratio such 
as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), which have been used several times to 
examine the neural correlates of conformity-related processes (Berns et al., 2005; Campbell-
Meiklejohn et al., 2012a; Klucharev, Hytönen, Rijpkema, Smidts, & Fernández, 2009; 
Klucharev, Munneke, Smidts, & Fernández, 2011). Perhaps more important is the potential 
confounding effect of asking participants to respond in private while the confederates, who 
the participant believes to be other participants, respond publicly. Abrams and colleagues 
have argued that the distinction between the way in which the group of confederates respond 
(publicly), and the way in which the participant responds (privately), may result in the 
participant feeling like an out-group member. This may cause them to anti-conform to the 
confederates, reducing the observed magnitude of any conformity effect due to informational 
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influence. Ideally then, the private / public response manipulation would be on a within-
subjects level and the participants and confederates would respond in a similar manner. 
The Asch task itself has been criticised on a number of methodological grounds, 
several of which were noted soon after the Asch experiments were originally published (e.g. 
Crutchfield, 1955). Chief among these criticisms is the fact that the original Asch task is an 
insensitive measure; the choice of only three response options, two of which are very 
obviously wrong, presumably means that a great deal of pressure to conform must be 
experienced before an incorrect option is chosen. Small effects of social influence are 
therefore likely to go undetected. The use of only three response options also means the size 
of any conformity effect is impossible to measure; therefore, the degree of conformity in the 
task refers to the frequency of conformity across trials, rather than the size of the effect on 
any one trial. The use of a continuous response scale would alleviate these problems, 
although as far as we are aware continuous response scales have only been used with ‘off-
line’ conformity paradigms where participants do not interact directly with group members in 
real life, but instead receive false feedback as to the responses of a group who had previously 
completed the task (e.g. Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2012a, 2012b; Klucharev et al., 2009, 
2011; Zaki, Schirmer, & Mitchell, 2011). Meta-analytic work has demonstrated that off-line 
conformity paradigms result in reduced conformity effects compared to on-line paradigms in 
which participants interact with group members, and off-line paradigms are thought to induce 
conformity through different mechanisms to on-line paradigms (Bond & Smith, 1996; 
Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Levy, 1960).  
This paper therefore reports preliminary data obtained using a novel on-line social 
conformity task based on the original Asch paradigm which was designed to measure the 
effects of normative and informational influence on a within-subjects level utilising public 
and private responses – thus identifying whether both compliance and acceptance may be 
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induced in individuals by the group. Furthermore, participant and confederate responses were 
obtained using the same method, eliminating a factor which may have resulted in the 
participant feeling like an out-group member and anti-conforming from group responses in 
previous studies. Finally, participants were able to use a continuous response scale, meaning 
that small effects of social influence could be detected.  
Participants were asked to take part in a study on ‘the effect of motor preparation on 
perception.’ They were told that they would be tested in groups of four, for efficiency, and 
asked to judge the colour of a patch on a central screen. They were informed that they would 
need to type their responses on some trials, and speak their responses on other trials as the 
experiment was designed to compare the effect of preparing a manual versus a vocal response 
on colour perception. The order of responding was fixed such that the participant was the last 
to give a response. Thus, randomly across trials, it was either the case that the participant and 
confederates all typed their responses (baseline trials in which no social influence was 
present), the participant typed their response after the confederates had spoken their 
responses out loud (private conformity condition), the participant and confederates gave 
spoken responses (public conformity condition), or the participant and two of the three 
confederates gave a spoken response while one confederate typed their response (‘reduced 
majority’ trials in which the participant responded publicly but where the majority consisted 
of 2 rather than 3 confederates). Reduced majority trials were also included to ensure the 
response style for confederates and participants did not differ across trials (i.e. all participants 
experienced private trials). Given previous results it was predicted that an informational 
influence (indicated by private conformity) as well as a normative influence (indicated by 
greater public compared to private conformity) would be identified. It was also predicted that 
the informational effect would be smaller in magnitude than that of normative influence and, 
that the normative effect would be greater in magnitude as the size of the majority increases. 
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The presence of reduced majority trials, where only 2 confederate responses are available 
(compared to 3 on a standard public trial) allows for this comparison to be made.  
7.2.  Materials and Methods 
7.2.1.  Participants.  Twenty-two healthy adult female individuals (mean age = 21.2 
years, SD = 2.8) were recruited through the King’s College London research recruitment 
website. Therefore, all participants were either staff or students at King’s College London, 
from a wide variety of disciplines. For recruitment to the study, it was a requirement that 
participants had not previously studied psychology at college or higher education level. Only 
female participants were recruited in order to remove the potential for out-group effects based 
on the sex of the participant compared to that of the (female) confederates. Participants were 
informed that this was a study investigating the effect of ‘motor preparation on perception’ 
and that the investigators were interested in better understanding how motor preparation for 
spoken versus typed responses impacts on visual perception. They were also told that to 
speed up data collection, and depending on the number of participants signed up to the 
timeslot, they would be tested in a group of up to 4 participants. In fact, each participant 
performed the task alongside 3 other individuals, all of whom were confederates of the 
experimenter. On arrival participants reported normal or corrected to normal vision, and they 
were asked to confirm their area of study, or department in which they worked at King’s 
College London. Following the experiment, participants were fully debriefed as to the true 
nature of the experiment. During a funnelled debrief – whereby participants were asked a 
series of questions which started broad and open-ended and funnelled to more specific 
questions to gauge their level of awareness of the true study aims – it was apparent that only 
one participant believed their fellow participants in the experiment to be confederates (and 
this one additional participant was excluded, leaving 21 participants’ data for analysis).  
158 
7.2.2.  Experimental procedure 
7.2.2.1.  Room and confederate setup.  The same 3 female confederates performed 
the task alongside each participant. They were undergraduate psychology students from 
King’s College London (mean age = 20.3 years), and their mean age did not differ 
significantly from the mean age of the participant sample (p > .05). In each instance, 
Participant 1 (confederate) arrived 15 minutes prior to the testing slot to ensure they were 
always first to arrive, taking a seat at Position 1 (see Figure 1 for seating position labels). 
Following this, the real participant would be allowed time to arrive (most arriving a few 
minutes early for the testing session). The experimenter would instruct the participant to enter 
the testing room and take a seat at any laptop. To reduce uncontrolled interaction between the 
participant and confederates prior to the task, they were told to sit quietly whilst reading the 
instruction sheet and consent form. Due to the layout of the room, every participant without 
prompting chose to sit at Position 4. With the testing room door open to the half way point, 
Position 2 was blocked for the participant to take a seat in this position, and of the two 
positions remaining, seating themselves at Position 3 would block another participant’s 
access to Position 4. Thus, all participants followed the same pattern of seating themselves at 
Position 4 without direct instruction from the experimenter. Finally, in each instance, 
Participant 2 (confederate) would arrive a minute or two after the participant and take a seat 
at Position 2, followed by Participant 3 (confederate) who would arrive shortly after calling 
to ask for directions to the testing room and take the last remaining seat (Position 3). The 
participant number assigned to the confederates was counterbalanced across testing sessions. 
Finally, the 4 testing laptops (all 15.6-inch, ASUS-Z550C, running Windows 10) were 
labelled with a sticker denoting the participant number prior to the testing session. See Figure 
1 for positions corresponding to the participant number assigned during the experiment. 
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 Figure 1. Room layout for the experiment showing locations of the main TV screen with 
respect to the experimenter and each of the 4 participant seating positions. All individuals 
appearing in the photo have given full permission for the use of this image. 
 
7.2.2.2.  Visual perception task.  The visual perception task was programmed and run 
using Cogent and Cogent Graphics for Matlab. In the task, participants were required to make 
judgements about the colour of squares presented on a large central TV screen (Samsung-
DM65D, 65-inch display, running Windows 10 software; see Figure 1 for location in the 
testing room). The colour of the squares could lie anywhere on a scale from white to black. 
Following the presentation of the square, a colour bar was presented on the TV screen. 
Participants were required to give a numerical response, matching the colour of the square 
with the same colour on the colour bar and reporting the colour’s numerical value (see Figure 
2). On some trials participants were asked to type their response using the numeric keyboard 
and during others they were asked to say their response out loud for the experimenter to 
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record. These instructions were given to each participant on their own laptop screen for each 
trial. They were instructed to pay very close attention to whether they should say or type their 
response on each trial, as this would sometimes differ across participants. For example, 
during any one trial, all participants could be required to say their responses out loud or they 
may all be required to type their response. Alternatively, on some trials one of the participants 
may be instructed to type their response whilst all other participants were instructed to say 
their response. Ostensibly, in order for the experimenter to record the spoken responses by 
hand, participants were instructed to respond in ascending participant number order.  
7.2.2.3.  Single trial structure.  The experimenter verbally introduced each new trial 
and the trial number was displayed (e.g. ‘Trial 1’, ‘Trial 2’, ‘Trial 3’) on the main TV screen 
and each participant’s laptop screen. Each new trial (see Figure 2 for a visual depiction of one 
trial) began with the trial number as well as a coloured square being presented on the main 
TV screen for 3 seconds. The trial number was also displayed on the participants’ laptop 
screens during these 3 seconds. The square was then replaced by a colour bar on the main TV 
screen (showing shades from black to white; with labels in 10-step increments from 0-100), 
and simultaneously, each participant was instructed on their own laptop screen whether they 
should type or say their answer on that trial. Participant 1 then made their response, followed 
by the other participants in ascending participant order. During trials where any participant 
was instructed to type their response, their laptop would beep after two digits had been 
pressed using the numeric keyboard. This acted as an auditory cue for the next participant to 
respond. Participants were instructed that they could respond using any number on the colour 
bar scale between 01 and 99. At the end of the trial, all participants and the experimenter 
pressed the space bar to move the experiment onto the next trial. The protocol began with 10 
practice trials, followed by 153 trials in the main experiment, with 2 short breaks after each 



























Figure 2. Example structure of one trial in the experiment showing display presented on a) 
the main TV screen (visible to all participants), b) the real participant’s screen and c) a 
confederate’s screen. * The TV screen programme waits for a space bar press to trigger the 
next trial, as do participant and confederate laptops during spoken trials. During typed trials, 
the programme waits for two digits to be typed before displaying the number on the screen, 
after which the programme waits for a space bar press to trigger the next trial.  
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7.2.2.4.  Trial type manipulations.  To allow for public and private performance to be 
assessed within the same task, different trial types were introduced. First, to gauge the 
participants’ baseline performance when judging the colour of the squares, there were 18 
‘silent’ trials during which all participants were instructed to type their response. Second, 
‘private’ trials were introduced (27 in total) during which the participant was required to type 
their response (and therefore this response remained private) whilst all other participants were 
instructed to say their response. All 4 participants (i.e. the real participant plus each of the 
three confederates) experienced their own set of 27 private trials where they were required to 
type their response. These trials constitute the private condition when the participant 
responded privately, and reduced majority trials when each of the confederates responded 
privately. Finally, during ‘public’ trials, all participants were instructed to say their response 
(27 in total). Although these trials constitute the public condition, for analysis purposes it 
should be noted that during reduced majority trials the participant was required to their 
response publicly after two responses from confederates, therefore these trials could be 
considered public trials with only two confederate responses rather than three. Based on the 
seminal studies of Asch (1951, 1955), one may expect to also see a conformity effect on 
reduced majority trials, although of lesser magnitude than on the public trials with three 
confederate responses. Across the whole experiment, responses on 30% of trials for each 
participant were typed, and 70% spoken. 
7.2.2.5.  Confederate congruency manipulation.  In line with Asch’s original 
conformity studies (Asch, 1951, 1955, 1956), within each of the private and public conditions 
there was a ratio of 1:2 congruent to incongruent trials. Here, congruency refers to the 
relationship between the correct response and the responses given by the confederates. 
During congruent trials confederates gave a correct answer, while during incongruent trials 
they gave an incorrect answer. Confederates were instructed as to which response to give via 
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their laptop screens. During each trial, according to the trial type, a number was calculated for 
each confederate to be instructed to respond by taking the correct square colour (e.g. 50) and 
adding or subtracting values from this. On an incongruent trial, 15 was added to or subtracted 
from this value (e.g. 35 or 65), as well as a small amount of jitter between 0 and 3 (e.g. values 
between 32 and 38 on a trial where the confederates responded lower than the correct 
response of 50, or between 62 and 68 on a trial where the confederates responded higher than 
the correct response of 50). For congruent trials, however, only the jitter of 0, 1, 2, or 3 was 
added to or subtracted from the correct response (e.g. confederate responses could vary 
between 47 and 53 for a trial where the correct response was 50).  
7.3.  Results 
For each trial a ‘response discrepancy’ was calculated as the difference between the 
participant’s response and the correct response. These values were calculated relative to the 
direction of the responses of the confederates. Thus, positive values indicate a discrepancy in 
the participant’s response in the direction of the confederates’ responses and negative values 
indicate a discrepancy in the opposite direction to that of the confederates. For example, for a 
trial where the correct response was 50 and confederates responded higher on the scale, a 
response of 55 by the participant would be considered a response discrepancy of +5, whereas 
a response of 45 would be considered a response discrepancy of -5. However, for a trial 
where the correct response was again 50 but confederates responded lower on the scale, a 
response of 55 would be a response discrepancy of -5, whilst a response of 45 would be a 
response discrepancy of +5. This allows for a calculation of the degree to which participants 
shift their responses towards or away from the confederates’ responses during private and 
public trials. The private and public conformity effects were calculated as the difference 
between response discrepancies during their respective congruent and incongruent trials, thus 
providing a measure of the informational influence effect (indexed by the size of the private 
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effect) and the additional normative influence during public trials (indexed by the size of the 
public effect minus the private effect). 
Trials for which response discrepancies were ±2.5 standard deviations from each 
participant’s mean for each condition were discarded with an a priori threshold of 15% lost 
trials for participant inclusion. As it was not necessary to discard more than 15% of data for 
any participant, all participants’ data were retained for full data analysis. 
Figure 3 displays mean response discrepancies during each trial type. As observed in 
the original Asch paradigm, baseline performance was excellent; response discrepancies 
during silent trials did not significantly differ from 0 (t(20) = 0.40, p = .696), where 0 
indicates 100% accuracy. Thus, we can be sure that participants could perform the task with 
an extremely high degree of accuracy when they were not subject to responses of the 
confederates. Moreover, performance did not significantly differ from 0 during congruent 
trials for either private (t(20) = 1.69, p = .106) or public (t(20) = 0.76, p = .456) conditions. 
However, as predicted, response discrepancies were significantly larger, indicating 
conformity towards the confederates’ responses during incongruent trials relative to 
congruent trials in both the private (private congruent response discrepancy = 0.57, standard 
error of the mean [SEM] = 0.34, private incongruent = 2.10, SEM = 0.36; t(20) = 3.10, p = 
.006, d = 0.96) and public conditions (public congruent = -0.26, SEM = 0.34, public 
incongruent = 4.07, SEM = 0.41; t(20) = 7.79, p < .001, d = 2.51). 
Data were entered into a repeated-measures two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), 
with condition (private or public) and congruency (congruent or incongruent) as within-
subjects factors. This revealed no significant overall difference between performance in 
private and public trials (F(1,20) = 3.67, p = .070, ηp
2
= .16), but a significant main effect of 
congruency (F(1,20) = 69.76, p < .001, ηp
2
= .78) and crucially, a significant 
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condition*congruency interaction (F(1,20) = 12.66, p = .002, ηp
2
= .39), showing congruency 
effects to be significantly larger during public compared to private trials. 
 
Figure 3. Bar graph representing mean response discrepancies for each trial type. ** indicates 
significance at p < .001 and * indicates significance at p < .05. Grey lines show comparisons 
between standard public trials and reduced majority public trials. 
 
The conformity effect during private trials can be considered to arise only from 
informational influence and this effect is indeed significantly different from 0 (t(21) = 3.10, p 
= .006). However, the additional conformity effect observed on public trials (public minus 
private effect) can be accounted for by normative influence, and is also significantly different 
from 0 (t(21) = 3.56, p = .002). Thus, we see the significant presence of both informational 
and normative influence. Moreover, it is possible to compare the relative magnitude of 
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informational influence (indexed by the private conformity effect; mean = 1.53, SEM = 0.50) 
and normative influence (indexed by public conformity minus private conformity effects; 
mean = 2.80, SEM = 0.79). Although the normative influence is numerically larger than that 
of informational influence, the normative influence was not significantly greater in magnitude 
than informational influence when assessed statistically (t(20) = 1.06, p = .303, d = 0.42). 
Power analyses conducted with the observed effect size indicate an increased sample size of 
40 participants would be sufficient to see a significant difference between the size of the 
effects (alpha = 0.05, beta = 0.8). 
A significant congruency effect was also observed on public trials when responses of 
only two confederates were available to the participant (i.e. on reduced majority trials; t(20) = 
9.05, p < .001, d = 2.73), whereby response discrepancies were larger during incongruent 
(mean = 3.21, SEM = 0.32) than congruent trials (mean = -0.59, SEM = 0.19). To examine 
the impact of the size of the majority (number of confederate responses available to the 
participant) on performance during public trials, we compared congruency effects as well as 
response discrepancies from incongruent trials between public trials where responses of 2 
versus 3 confederates were available to the participant. Response discrepancies during 
incongruent public trials were significantly larger when the majority consisted of 3 
confederates (mean = 4.07, SEM = 0.41) than 2 confederates (mean = 3.21, SEM = 0.32; 
t(20) = 2.72, p = .013, d = 0.51). Moreover, there was a significantly increased congruency 
effect under a majority of 3 (mean = 4.33, SEM = 0.56) compared to 2 (mean = 3.27, SEM = 
0.36; t(20) = 2.29, p = .033, d = 0.49) confederates. 
Finally, the magnitude of informational and normative influence can be compared for 
trials in which only two confederates’ responses were available to the participant. Once 
again, the normative influence here (mean = 1.74, SEM = 0.63) is numerically, but not 
statistically, larger than that of informational influence (mean = 1.53, SEM = 0.50; t(20) = 
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0.19, p = .851). The normative influence arising from 3 confederate trials was significantly 
greater than the normative influence arising from 2 confederate trials (t(20) = 2.29, p = .033, 
d = 0.32).  
7.4.  Discussion 
Compliance and acceptance are types of social influence which can be discriminated 
on the basis of their effect on the beliefs or attitude of the individual. Compliance occurs 
when the individual publicly accepts the group’s position but privately adheres to their own 
belief, while acceptance occurs when the individual internalises the belief or attitude of the 
group such that it becomes their own. Compliance is thought to be the result of normative 
influence; where the individual complies with group norms due to the social power of the 
group. Acceptance is thought to be the result of informational influence; where individuals 
seek information from others in order to determine the true state of the world. The impact of 
normative and informational influence can be determined through on-line conformity 
paradigms by comparing responses made by individuals in private and in public. Here we 
report a novel paradigm, based on that of Asch (1951, 1955), in which both normative and 
informational influence can be measured on a within-subjects basis. Results indicated 
significant conformity effects (congruency effects) during both private and public conditions, 
and crucially, a greater conformity effect during public than private trials, demonstrating the 
presence of both informational influence in the private condition and the addition of 
normative influence during public conditions. Therefore, we see demonstrations of both 
acceptance and compliance within the same task. 
The preliminary data reported here suggest that the paradigm is a valid test of social 
conformity. Based on Asch’s (1951, 1955) original paradigm, it compared performance on a 
test of colour matching in a baseline condition when participants were unaware of the group’s 
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judgements, when they were aware of the responses of two or three confederates but could 
give their own response in private, and when participants were aware of the responses of two 
or three confederates and had to give their responses in public. In common with Asch’s 
original findings, participants conformed to the judgements of others in the group; despite the 
task being sufficiently easy (participants’ responses were extremely accurate when not 
influenced by the group), responses were more inaccurate when the group gave incorrect 
responses. Also in common with the findings of Asch was the observation that the degree of 
conformity was greater when participants were exposed to three confederates than two. This 
was observed even though the ‘degree of conformity’ in the original Asch paradigm refers to 
the frequency of conformity, whereas here it refers to the magnitude of the conformity effect 
on a per trial basis.  
The paradigm reported here has the advantage that measures of normative and 
informational influence are obtained from the same individual at the same point in time, 
facilitating sensitive comparisons as to their magnitude and enabling future studies using 
techniques such as fMRI which are reliant upon within-subject comparisons. In addition, the 
participant is not excluded from the group due to their private responses, avoiding the 
possibility of anti-conformity to the group judgements which may have influenced prior 
studies (Abrams et al., 1990). Finally, the use of a continuous response scale allowed 
extremely subtle effects to be detected.  
While the present results are encouraging, and support the validity of the task as a 
measure of conformity and its ability to measure informational and normative influence, it 
should be noted the results were obtained with a relatively small sample size and are 
therefore in need of further replication. In addition, as the current study was primarily aimed 
at task development and validation, variance due to key individual differences was 
deliberately reduced. For example, due to the literature on sex differences in social 
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conformity (Cooper, 1979; Eagly, Wood, & Fishbaugh, 1981; Larsen, Triplett, Brant, & 
Langenberg, 1979), both concerning the sex of the participant and also whether the group is 
of the same or opposite sex to that of the participant, the current study included only female 
participants and a group of female confederates. Moreover, we restricted our sample to young 
adults (aged 19-30 years) to reduce age-related individual differences.  
It can be seen then, that although these results support the use of the task to measure 
compliance and acceptance, types of social influence thought to arise from normative and 
informational influence respectively, further work is required to establish the replicability of 
these findings, and how they are moderated by factors such as age, sex, and culture. 
7.5.  Conclusions 
Here we present preliminary data validating a task designed to identify compliance 
and acceptance as a result of group influence, and therefore to identify normative and 
informational influences on decision-making. Although heavily based on the conformity 
paradigm developed by Asch (1951, 1955), the task has several advantages over previous 
versions of the Asch paradigm. Firstly, public and private responding is manipulated on a 
within-subjects basis rather than between-subjects, providing a more sensitive measure of any 
difference in social influence in the two conditions. This feature also allows participants to 
respond in the same manner as confederates, reducing the likelihood that they will classify 
themselves as an out-group member. Secondly, participants were able to respond on a 
continuous scale – this enabled a graded measure of conformity to be established such that 
the magnitude of any effect on a single trial could be measured and subtle effects of 
conformity detected. Results supported previous claims of both normative and informational 
influences in Asch-type paradigms, with normative influence increasing with increasing 
majority size in such paradigms. 
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7.6.  Supplementary Data Analysis for Chapter 7 
 Chapter 7 describes a task designed to investigate higher-level, group social 
interaction, whilst still eliciting conflict between the self and others. To place this chapter and 
the task in the context of this thesis, these self-other interference effects on performance 
during the simple visual perception task can be seen during both private and public social 
conformity settings. More explicitly, conformity was higher during trials in which the 
confederates’ responses were incongruent compared to congruent with the correct response in 
both private and public conditions, and the interference effect was greater during the public 
than private condition. This demonstrates both a form of informational influence which 
occurs during private situations, as well as an additional normative influence which occurs 
during public situations. However, in line with the current thesis and findings from Chapters 
2 (Sowden, Koehne, Catmur, Dziobek, & Bird, 2016), and 6 whereby autistic trait severity 
appears to be related to the size of these self-other interference effects (whether in the domain 
of imitation-inhibition or lie detection), it is of interest to assess the same question with the 
current task. 
 Due to time restraints, the shortened 10-item Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ-10) was 
given to all participants prior to completion of the task. However, previous research has 
demonstrated that the AQ-10 is as successful in classifying Autism Spectrum Disorder as the 
50-item version of the AQ (Booth et al., 2013). Bivariate correlations reveal a significant 
positive correlation between AQ-10 scores and the public conformity effect under our one-
tailed prediction based on our previous studies (r = .396, p = .038) but not the private 
conformity effect (r = -.153, p = .254). Moreover, under a one-tailed prediction, there was a 
significant positive correlation between AQ-10 scores and the difference between public and 
private conformity effects (r = .377, p = .046). This difference score is reflective of the 
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additional normative influence over and above that of informational influence. See Figure 4 
for scatterplots of these relationships.   
Although underpowered to detect anything but large effects, this pilot data does 
suggest promise for the use of the task in the future investigation of self-other control and its 
relationship to autistic traits. The data are suggestive of a selective relationship between 
autistic traits and self-other interference effects specifically in public situations, as well as 
specific to normative, rather than informational influence. This may suggest different and 
distinct levels of self-other control, dependent on how an individual (the self) is influenced by 




Figure 4. Scatterplots of the relationship between a) AQ scores and the public effect and b) 
AQ scores and the public minus private effect.  
a) b) 
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8.  General Discussion 
8.1.  Summary of Data Chapters 
It is intuitive that during any social interaction, the actions, beliefs, intentions, speech or 
affective state of the person we are interacting with will have an influence on ourselves. The 
current thesis aimed to investigate the mechanism by which the impact of both the other on 
the self, and the self on the other, can be controlled. The thesis focussed on the complex 
requirement for individuals to represent, and deal with conflict between, both the self and 
other(s) in various social domains. This thesis therefore examined whether a mechanism 
coined ‘self-other control’ may help to explain both typical and atypical social cognitive 
function. There were three main themes to this research which included the use and 
development of behavioural indices of self-other control across domains of social cognition, 
utilising these tasks to assess the integrity of self-other control in relation to disorders of 
social cognition, and finally to further examine the neural basis of such a mechanism for 
social cognition. 
 A brief summary and interpretation with respect to the thesis aims will now be given 
for each chapter separately, as well as discussion of the strengths and limitations associated 
with each chapter. 
   8.1.1.  Chapter 2 
 8.1.1.1.  Summary and interpretation.  Chapter 2 (Sowden, Koehne, Catmur, 
Dziobek, & Bird, 2016a) examined imitative behaviour in two samples of individuals with 
and without a diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), in order to establish whether 
the Broken Mirror Theory of ASD is a plausible explanation for the social impairments 
experienced by these individuals. As highlighted in this chapter, there are a number of flaws 
in the neuroscientific investigation of the mirror neuron system (MNS; Hamilton, 2013) and 
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thus behavioural measures of automatic imitation provide one of the most promising 
measures of MNS integrity, as automatic imitation is thought to be mediated by the MNS 
(Catmur, Walsh, & Heyes, 2009; Heiser, Iacoboni, Maeda, Marcus, & Mazziotta, 2003).  
 Using a well-controlled experimental task, Experiment 1 provided the first large scale 
demonstration that automatic imitative behaviour, and thus the functioning of the MNS, is 
intact in individuals with ASD and a matched sample of neurotypical control participants. 
Moreover, Experiment 2 introduced the key addition of a non-social control variant of the 
task, whereby a more general cognitive control ability could be measured. Using this isolated, 
purer measure of imitative control, Experiment 2 demonstrated that imitative behaviour was 
not only intact in a group of individuals with clinical diagnoses of ASD but in fact appeared 
to be increased with increasing autism symptom severity. This association was selective to 
the social, and not the non-social, element of the task and thus to the process involving the 
control of self and other motor representations. 
 Therefore, with respect to the main question of the current thesis, this evidence 
suggests that simple representation of the ‘self’ and ‘other’ is indeed intact in individuals with 
ASD, but that the increased imitation observed here may reflect an impairment in the ability 
to control or modulate these representations online during the task. Accordingly, these data 
support the idea that individuals with ASD may experience impairments in ‘self-other 
control’, and that these cannot be attributed to a more general executive or attentional control 
process. 
8.1.1.2.  Strengths and limitations.  Experiment 1 provides the first investigation of 
automatic imitation in a large and therefore adequately-powered sample. Where previous 
investigations may have been underpowered, this sample should be sufficiently powered to 
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detect any differences in imitative behaviour between groups should they exist, and thus is a 
valuable replication and extension of previous findings. 
Moreover, the experimental tasks of imitation used here are good as they measure a 
form of automatic, involuntary imitation, which controls for other high-level cognitive and 
motivational processes known to differ between ASD and neurotypical individuals, such as 
working memory, executive functioning and pragmatic language understanding (Courchesne 
et al., 1994; Happé & Frith, 1995; Russell, 1997; Williams, Goldstein, Carpenter, & 
Minshew, 2005). These are cognitive abilities inherent in previously employed voluntary 
imitation measures (Williams, Whiten, & Singh, 2004) and thus the current study provides a 
purer measure of imitation. Moreover, both tasks employ a non-social control element to the 
task, which is an improvement on the original imitation-inhibition task. For example, the task 
from Experiment 1 included a control task (termed effector compatibility) whereby on half of 
trials, rather than a finger lift being observed, the finger was simply highlighted by a green 
mask, drawing attention to the relevant effector but without a finger lift which would elicit a 
neural motor representation of the action in the participant’s own brain.  
Furthermore, the task from Experiment 2 took this one step further to create the most 
recently revised version of the imitation-inhibition task (Sowden & Catmur, 2015), which 
includes rigorous experimental control over the measure of imitative compatibility but also a 
non-social, spatial compatibility variant on the task. The main advantage of this task is that 
both spatial and imitative compatibility are measured during each trial of the experiment with 
precisely the same experimental stimuli, making them perfectly matched to one another. Each 
level of imitative compatibility (compatible/incompatible) is measured at each level of spatial 
compatibility (compatible/incompatible), eliminating the chance of different task demands or 
stimuli between the two key conditions influencing the results. This also allows conclusions 
to be made regarding the specificity of the relationship between ASD severity and imitative 
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control and not to just a general form of executive or attentional control known to be 
impaired in these individuals (Bird, Catmur, Silani, Frith, & Frith, 2006; Courchesne et al., 
1994).  
Nevertheless, it could be important to consider whether there is another level on 
which to distinguish imitative and spatial compatibility in task 2 which is not related to the 
social versus non-social element of the task. It may be that the selectivity of the mapping 
between the stimulus and the response distinguishes these two measures in their relationship 
with ASD severity. For example, at the imitative level, mappings may be considered to be 
one-to-one, whereby the representation of the other’s action (index finger lift) maps onto 
one’s own representation of that action at a high level of specificity, thus promoting a specific 
index finger lift response in the observer. However, at the spatial level, the observation of a 
movement on the left side of body space activates a far less selective motor representation for 
any movement on the left side of the body. It may be that ASD severity is therefore 
associated with cognitive control performance when there are one-to-one mappings between 
the stimulus and response, as opposed to the social versus non-social nature of the 
representations elicited. Further investigations to pick apart imitative and spatial 
compatibility may help to shed light on this potential alternative explanation. 
Additionally, it should be taken into account that although the use of the current tasks 
allowed for a high degree of control over additional cognitive demands inherent to more 
high-level tasks, these may be considered to lack ecological validity. The stimuli used include 
only the presence of hands (in isolation from the rest of the human body) and these are 
portrayed in two positions only; a static (at rest) position which transitions to an action 
performance position where a finger is lifted in isolation from the rest of the hand. This is not 
typical of the way we observe hand actions in everyday social interactions and thus caution 
should be taken in extending these results to all aspects of everyday imitative behaviour. 
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However, at this early stage of investigation, it is beneficial to have a high degree of 
experimental control over extraneous variables, to isolate the measurement of the processes 
which are and are not impaired in individuals with ASD. It may also be posited that, in a 
study investigating the control of self and other representations, stimuli presented from a 
third-person perspective (e.g. rotated by 180°) would be more appropriate than the current 
hand stimuli which are presented from a first-person perspective. Participants may associate 
these more with the self and thus a more self-referential process may be elicited here. Third-
person perspective hand stimuli may be more successful in eliciting true representations of 
the ‘other’ in future investigations. 
Finally, this chapter assesses the plausibility of the Broken Mirror Theory of brain 
function in ASD. However, no measure of neuronal function was included and therefore the 
integrity of the MNS in these individuals is inferred from a behavioural measure as a well-
established product - but an indirect index - of MNS activity. It may be better to combine this 
task with a neuroscientific method. Conversely, at present, assessments of neuroimaging 
investigations of MNS function in ASD reveal huge inconsistencies (Hamilton, 2013) and 
therefore cast doubt on the validity of these methods. Instead, causal evidence from brain 
stimulation maybe be more fruitful in combination with these behavioural indices of MNS 
function.  
8.1.2.  Chapter 3 
 8.1.2.1.  Summary and interpretation.  Chapter 3 (Sowden, Brewer, Catmur, & Bird, 
2016b) of the current thesis investigated the relationship between alexithymic traits and the 
integrity of self-other control via the same revised imitation task used in Experiment 2 of 
Chapter 2 (Sowden & Catmur, 2015). Recent evidence predicts an association here as 
alexithymia is purported to be characterised by impairments in one’s ability to perceive the 
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internal state of one’s own body (Brewer, Cook, & Bird, 2016a, 2016b; Murphy, Catmur, & 
Bird, in press), which is suggested to be crucial for awareness of one’s own body 
representations and its distinction from the body representations of others (Seth, 2013; 
Quattrocki & Friston, 2014). Thus, in line with recent evidence of the relationship between 
imitation-inhibition (as an index of self-other control) and interoceptive ability (Ainley, 
Brass, & Tsakiris, 2014), as well as evidence for the relationship between alexithymia and 
interoceptive ability (Brewer et al., 2016b; Murphy et al., in press; Shah, Hall, Catmur, & 
Bird, 2016), a relationship was predicted between imitation-inhibition and alexithymia in the 
current study.  
The results from this chapter support this prediction, whereby increasing alexithymia 
was associated with an improved ability to inhibit imitation, with precisely the same 
specificity as imitation-inhibition has previously been found to associate with interoceptive 
ability (Ainley et al., 2014). For example, the relationship was not only specific to imitative, 
and not spatial, compatibility (as a non-social, attentional control variant), but was also 
specific to imitatively incompatible trial performance. This suggests the relationship is driven 
by the ability to distinguish and control representations of one’s own motor representation 
from that of the other when the self and other are in conflict, rather than being driven by the 
basic tendency to imitate. Moreover, alexithymia showed a specific predictive relationship 
here, which was independent of any relationship with autistic traits when measured by 
Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) scores. 
 Therefore, a few conclusions can be drawn from the present study. Firstly, in 
conjunction with the data by Ainley and colleagues, the data support the suggestion that 
alexithymia may not only be characterised by impairments in interpreting emotions of the self 
and others but rather, by a general deficit in interoception; the ability to perceive and interpret 
the internal representational state of both the self and others. This may help to explain the 
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broad co-occurrence of alexithymia with a number of disorders of social cognition such as 
autism, schizophrenia and eating disorders (Brewer et al., 2016a; Murphy, Brewer, Catmur, 
& Bird, 2017). Additionally, these findings are significant for our understanding of the 
specificity of intercoceptive and behavioural profiles of individuals with high levels of 
alexithymia, and necessitate revision of current theoretical models of the relationship between 
interoception, self-other control and social cognitive ability. 
Finally, with respect to the main theme of the current thesis, these data extend our 
understanding of the role of self-other control across disorders of social cognition. They 
begin to reveal the important role for self-other control in the social impairments associated 
with alexithymia, and its independence from autistic traits.   
 8.1.2.2.  Strengths and limitations.  The strengths and limitations of the imitation task 
employed in this chapter are as outlined with respect to the task in Experiment 2 of Chapter 2. 
Specific to Chapter 3, however, the sample is a strength. A population sample was employed, 
where participants from the full range of alexithymia severities were investigated, providing a 
comprehensive assessment of the relationship between alexithymia and self-other control 
processing. Moreover, that an individual differences approach to assessing cognitive abilities 
as utilised here, is in line with current theories regarding the association between continuous 
measures of psychological or neuropsychiatric traits and cognitive abilities (Friedman & 
Miyake, 2017; Graham & Lachman, 2014; Kane et al., 2016). 
 Nevertheless, it should be taken into account that, although conclusions have been 
made regarding the relationship between three variables; interoception, alexithymia, and self-
other control, only the latter two are measured in the current study. The relationship between 
the three variables is only indirectly inferred due to a combination of previous strong 
associations found between; alexithymia and interoceptive ability (Brewer et al., 2016b; 
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Murphy et al., in press; Shah et al., 2016); interoception and self-other control (Ainley et al., 
2014); and in the current study between alexithymia and self-other control (Chapter 3; 
Sowden et al., 2016b). Thus, it will be important in future research to combine a measure of 
all three variables within the same study in order to gain a more direct measure of the 
relationships discussed here.    
8.1.3.  Chapter 5 
 8.1.3.1.  Summary and interpretation.  Chapter 5 (Sowden, Wright, Banissy, Catmur, 
& Bird, 2015), Experiment 1 details the development of a novel task requiring online self-
other control in the context of lie detection, whereby representations refer to the opinions of 
the self and the other. This video-mediated lie detection task was successful in eliciting self-
other interference effects equivalent to those observed in the imitation-inhibition task, with 
participants being significantly better at detecting truths and lies during trials in which the 
opinions of the self and the other were consistent, compared to inconsistent with one another. 
Experiment 2 then utilised this new index of self-other control to further investigate the 
involvement of the right temporoparietal junction (TPJ) in this process. As predicted, 
excitatory transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) to the right TPJ reduced this 
interference effect, improving lie detection performance in situations where the self and other 
opinions were inconsistent. Taken together, this chapter successfully establishes another 
domain of social cognition during which self-other control is required; where one must 
inhibit the self opinion and enhance that of the other person in order to perform the task 
successfully. By boosting the ability to control competing representations of the self and 
other – in this case inhibiting one’s own opinion in order to more accurately represent that of 
the other – TPJ stimulation can improve lie detection in situations of inconsistency between 
the self and other. 
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 8.1.3.2.  Strengths and limitations.  The task employed in both Experiment 1 and 2 of 
Chapter 5 is well matched to other tasks of self-other control as it elicits equivalent self-other 
interference effects – whereby performance is diminished under situations of self-other 
conflict compared to self-other non-conflict – but in the domain of lie detection where 
representations of self and other opinions are consistent or inconsistent. The task is, however 
more ecologically valid and is more typical of everyday social interaction than the imitation-
inhibition task. As is required in this task, in everyday life we are often exposed to 
individuals expressing ideas or opinions on a topic and are required to make online decisions 
about the credibility of the person and the opinion expressed. Missing from this task, 
however, and present in the imitation-inhibition task, is a separate measure of a non-social 
control variant on the task. This would allow the investigation of the selective nature of the 
TPJ’s involvement here, specific to ‘social’ self-other control and not to a more domain 
general mechanism of control. However, the specificity of self-other control and indeed the 
role of the TPJ to social cognition has now been well established via a number of other brain 
stimulation studies (Hogeveen et al., 2015; Santiesteban, Banissy, Catmur, & Bird, 2012a, 
2015; Sowden & Catmur, 2015). Thus, as a task well matched in terms of the requirement for 
online self-other representation and control, it is likely that the effect is also socially specific 
here. 
 In relation to Experiment 2 of Chapter 5 and the use of tDCS to the TPJ, based on the 
tDCS current best practice guidelines, the use of an active control site (namely the mid-
occipital control region) is superior to the use of only a sham control condition. The use of an 
active control site allows greater specificity in assessing the involvement of a particular brain 
region in the behaviour of interest (Parkin, Ekhtiari, & Walsh, 2015). This form of control is 
also better matched to the experimental stimulation condition in terms of the physical 
sensation over the scalp (Russo, Wallace, Fitzgerald, & Cooper, 2013). 
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 It is worth considering the reliability of tDCS here, as well as some reports of lack of 
replication of cognitive and neurobiological effects of stimulation (Horvath, Forte, & Carter, 
2015a, 2015b). Despite arguments that such meta-analyses are flawed in their approaches 
(Price & Hamilton, 2015), as well as good replicability of and promise for the effects of tDCS 
in enhancing self-other control (Hogeveen et al., 2015; Santiesteban et al., 2012a, 2015; 
Sellaro, Nitsche, & Colzato, 2017), some caution should be taken in interpreting the results 
from Experiment 2 until these have been replicated in an independent sample. A further 
negative feature relating to the use of tDCS over other methods of neurostimulation such as 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) is the reduced focality of stimulation. For example, 
tDCS electrodes are often 20 or 35 cm
2
 in surface area over the scalp, thus stimulating a 
larger region of the cortex compared to TMS which, when delivered using a figure-of-eight 
coil, is very focal in its stimulation. Moreover, the spatial resolution of tDCS is often 
compromised in such studies as stimulation points are based on the electroencephalography 
10/20 system and thus are not individually determined based on the participants’ own brains. 
However, previous studies (e.g. Hogeveen et al., 2015; Santiesteban et al., 2012a, 2015) 
using this same stimulation protocol found specific modulatory effects on social domains 
requiring self-other control (and not on domain general tasks of control). Thus, it is unlikely 
that focality or the spatial resolution are limiting factors in the present study. Nevertheless, 
the use of a more focal method of brain stimulation, such as TMS along with participant-
specific neuronavigation (as in Sowden & Catmur, 2015), or even the use of the newly 
developed high definition tDCS (Edwards et al., 2013), would provide successful avenues for 
future research to enhance the efficacy of stimulation and the replicability of the results 
concerning the involvement of the TPJ in self-other control. 
On a further critical note, the current study only investigated stimulation over the right 
TPJ, whereas a number of previous functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and lesion 
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studies have also shown the potential importance of the left TPJ in social functions (see Saxe, 
2009), and even more specifically in self-other control (Santiesteban et al., 2015). Thus, the 
use of bilateral stimulation may be interesting and would also reduce any potential right 
lateralised changes in overall neural connectivity. It is also worth noting that despite the 
present study focusing specifically on the involvement of the TPJ, another brain region 
argued to be particularly important in the process by which we control and perform social 
actions is the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), established via a number of fMRI studies 
(Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001; Brass, Derrfuss, Matthes-von Cramon, & von Cramon, 
2003; Brass, Derrfuss, & von Cramon, 2005; Brass, Ruby, & Spengler, 2009; Spengler, von 
Cramon, & Brass, 2009a, 2009b, 2010). Therefore, it seems intuitive that these areas form a 
network to fulfil this important function and as a result it is particularly important not to 
investigate these in isolation, but rather to observe connectivity and information flow 
between these two regions. A combination of brain stimulation and electroencephalography 
or fMRI seem appropriate techniques for such future investigations. 
8.1.4.  Chapter 6 
 8.1.4.1.  Summary and interpretation.  Chapter 6 extended the investigation of the 
integrity of self-other control in ASD to the use of the newly developed lie detection task 
outlined in Chapter 5. The self-other opinion consistency (or interference) effect found in 
Chapter 5 was not found in the control group in Chapter 6, and was trending towards 
significance in the individuals with clinical diagnoses of ASD. However, interestingly, the 
size of the consistency effect for each individual showed a significant positive association 
with autistic traits, as measured by the AQ. The greater the consistency effect (i.e. the poorer 
one’s self-other control), the higher the autism trait severity. This was apparent across the 
whole spectrum of autism trait severity, in both individuals with an ASD diagnosis and those 
at the low end of the spectrum. 
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 Thus, despite the lack of replication of the basic consistency effect, which will be 
further discussed in the limitations section, these data provide further evidence for the 
relationship between performance in another domain of self-other control and autistic traits, 
further supporting future research into self-other control as a candidate mechanism of atypical 
as well as typical social cognition. 
 8.1.4.2.  Strengths and limitations.  The strengths and limitations of the video-
mediated lie detection task employed in this chapter are the same as those outlined for 
Chapter 5. 
The sample size of the ASD group in the current experiment is a limitation and was 
restricted to the number of individuals with ASD available to be recruited and take part 
during the data collection period for this study. A trend towards a significant consistency 
effect with a medium effect size was observed in this group, suggesting that the sample was 
simply underpowered to detect the effect comparable to that found with the larger sample in 
Experiment 1 of Chapter 5. Power calculations reveal a sample size of 40 would be sufficient 
to reveal a significant consistency effect if it were to exist in this group. This does not, 
however, explain the non-replication of the basic lie detection consistency effect in the 
control group. Nevertheless, reassessment of the data from Chapter 5, Experiment 1 (Sowden 
et al., 2015) reveal consistency effects were largely driven by the females in the sample. In 
combination with our findings here of the relationship between increased autistic traits and 
increased consistency effects, it appears that consistency effects may be boosted by the 
presence of ASD as well as status as a female. Thus, a speculative explanation for the lack of 
a consistency effect found in the control sample may be that the current control sample was 
made up largely of males, whilst also possessing many individuals at the very low end of the 
autistic trait spectrum, both of which may have led to decreased or even reversed consistency 
effects to those observed in Chapter 5, Experiment 1. Unfortunately, AQ scores were not 
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available in Chapter 5 and thus a direct comparison cannot be made to the present study to 
ratify this explanation. Therefore, there is need for a large-scale replication of the basic 
consistency effect prior to future use of the task. 
8.1.5.  Chapter 7 
 8.1.5.1.  Summary and interpretation.  Chapter 7 presents preliminary data from the 
design and validation stage of a new group social interaction task aimed at separating out two 
mechanisms of social influence; informational and normative influence (resulting in 
acceptance and compliance, respectively). The current task was capable of eliciting 
conformity (or interference) effects, whereby conformity was higher during trials in which 
the confederates’ responses were incongruent compared to congruent with the correct 
response, in both private and public conditions. This conformity effect was observed to be 
larger in the public than private condition. This finding suggests the presence of 
informational influence, whereby an individual accepts a degree of truth in the responses of 
the others and as a result shifts their opinion towards that of others. However, this also 
suggests a significant addition of a normative influence effect during public responding trials, 
whereby public responding leads an individual to comply with the responses of the others in 
order to fit in, without necessarily holding that response as their true belief. 
 In the context of the current thesis, we can see two levels of social influence which 
require an individual to represent both the self and the other(s) and then to control these 
competing representations in order to respond successfully. Self-other interference effects 
occur because of the conflict between the self and others, leading to poorer performance 
when a group of confederates’ responses are incongruent with the correct response. In other 
words, this presents another social domain during which one must inhibit the representation 
one holds for the others’ beliefs and must enhance that of their own in order to perform well 
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at the task. Moreover, it appears, as was observed in Chapters 2 and 6, that such indices of 
self-other control may relate to individual differences in autistic trait severity, providing 
further evidence for self-other control as a candidate mechanism for the impairments across 
social domains in ASD. 
Finally, these data begin to introduce the idea that self-other interference effects, and 
therefore self-other control, may play a role at many levels of the same social domain. 
Despite there being higher level distinctions between the forms of social influence occurring, 
whether it be informational or normative influence (acceptance or compliance), it appears 
that self-other control may be a low-level mechanism at play across both of these forms of 
social influence.     
 8.1.5.2.  Strengths and limitations.  The current experiment is the first to extend the 
measurement of self-other performance interference effects to a novel high-level group social 
interaction task. Moreover, it was demonstrated that self-other interference effects can be 
investigated and observed at two levels of one social domain; performing a task under 
influence of a group of others in both public and private situations (when one’s response is 
either accessible or inaccessible to the rest of the group).  
Furthermore, the present task represents the first demonstration of conformity under 
public and private conditions within the same task and thus both were assessed within-
subjects with identical task demands and no impact of sampling differences between the two. 
Therefore, a direct comparison of these effects is afforded and allows conclusions to be made 
regarding the additional impact of public responding compared to responding in private. 
Nevertheless, it must still be appreciated that the current study is simply a small-scale 
pilot of the task. This requires replication in a larger sample as well as consideration for how 
the findings are influenced by individual differences known to impact on social conformity 
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(Bond & Smith, 1996; Crutchfield, 1955) such as sex, age, ethnicity and various personality 
traits of both the self and others. Here, however, all of these variables were kept as constant 
as possible to provide a more homogenous group of individuals more likely to behave in a 
consistent way. For example, only females were considered, as well as only students and staff 
from King’s College London, all aged between 19 and 30 years. Moreover, the task may be 
considered to lack ecological validity as it was a very simple, low-level visual perception task 
unlike any task which would be completed in a group social interaction in everyday life. 
However, this feature of the design was adopted in order to control for extraneous variables 
inherent in a more complex social interaction task. 
8.2.  General Summary and Interpretation 
In summary, this thesis presents a series of experiments aiming to investigate whether 
self-other control can be considered a candidate neurocognitive mechanism to explain both 
typical and atypical social cognitive function. The first theme of the current thesis led to the 
investigation of behavioural indices of self-other control across domains of social cognition 
and this body of research successfully extended well-established, low-level tasks such as the 
imitation-inhibition task to higher level tasks more reflective of complex everyday social and 
group interaction. Two novel tasks were designed (Chapters 5 and 7), which had the same 
requirement for online representation and control of the self and other as observed in 
traditional tasks which index self-other control. The first of these was a lie detection task 
which involved online representation and control of the opinions of the self and other, and the 
second task involved representing the responses of the self and a group of others during a 
simple visual perception task. These novel tasks follow the robust method of inducing self-
other performance interference effects, whereby performance is compared between situations 
when self and other(s’) representations were congruent (also termed ‘compatible’ or 
‘consistent’) and incongruent (also termed ‘incompatible’ or ‘inconsistent’) with one another. 
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As with the very first demonstration of this via the task of automatic imitation (Stürmer, 
Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2000), interference effects are observed when the representation an 
individual creates of the action/opinion/visual percept of another individual is conflicting 
with that of one’s own; causing a performance detriment relative to situations when the 
representation of the self and other(s) are not in conflict. 
 Moreover, the second theme concerns whether self-other control may be considered a 
candidate mechanism to explain the broad range of social impairments observed in disorders 
of social cognition, such as ASD (Sowden & Shah, 2014). Chapters 2, 3, 6 and 7 in the 
current thesis behaviourally assessed the integrity of self-other control in relation to atypical 
social cognition, either using case/control designs or by examining traits across the general 
population. Most focus (Chapters 2, 6 and 7) was on autistic traits and ASD as the 
prototypical disorder of social cognition, but alexithymia, as another condition argued to be 
associated with atypicalities in self-other processing was also assessed (Chapter 3). Although, 
no differences in self-other control were observed between ASD and Control groups in 
Chapters 2 and 6, this highlights the importance of considering disorders as a spectrum of 
trait severities. Accordingly, findings from this thesis reveal significant relationships between 
tasks indexing self-other control and autistic and alexithymic traits. Increased autistic traits 
were associated with increased self-other interference effects, and thus impaired self-other 
control across three different tasks, whereas increased alexithymic traits were associated with 
decreased imitation, and thus superior self-other control. This association with alexithymia 
was also observed to be independent from any relationship between autistic traits and 
imitation-inhibition. 
Our understanding of the role of self-other control in atypical social functioning is 
broadened from the data in the current thesis. Despite strong associations between 
alexithymia and autistic traits as well as between these traits and self-other control, these two 
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clinical traits appear to be independently and differentially associated with self-other control 
processes. Nevertheless, Chapters 2 and 3, in their use of the imitation-inhibition task as the 
index of self-other control, do demonstrate that both clinical traits are selectively associated 
with the imitative and not the non-social spatial control element of the task. Thus, self-other 
control may indeed be considered a candidate mechanism contributing to social functioning 
both across domains as well as disorders of social cognition (Sowden & Shah, 2014), but it is 
important to also consider its independent or dissociable role in different disorders. 
 Additionally, the current thesis further explored the neural basis of self-other control. 
Specifically, the role of the right TPJ in this mechanism was investigated using tDCS and 
utilising the novel, higher-level task of self-other control in the context of lie detection 
(Chapter 5). The findings from this chapter indeed support the role of self-other control and 
the right TPJ across low and higher-level domains of social cognition.  
 Finally, the use of the revised imitation-inhibition task (Sowden & Catmur, 2015) in 
Chapters 2 and 3 allow some conclusions to be made regarding the specificity of self-other 
control to social cognition. For instance, the task dissociates two control processes within 
each trial of the experiment; one concerning imitative control (the ability to inhibit the 
tendency to imitate an action performed by the other) and the other process concerning a non-
social, attentional or executive control process (the ability to inhibit the tendency to perform a 
response which is spatially compatible with an observed action). These two processes have 
previously been shown to be dissociable in their recruitment of the TPJ (Sowden & Catmur, 
2015) and Chapters 2 and 3 also show the selective relationship between the imitative control 
(but not the spatial control) element of the task and autistic and alexithymic traits. Thus, in 
conjunction, these data further support the idea that the TPJ and the mechanism of self-other 
control has a domain specific role in social cognition as opposed to acting as a general 
inhibitory control mechanism. It is particularly important to consider the selectivity of this 
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control mechanism to social impairments in ASD as these individuals are consistently 
reported to show general executive or cognitive control impairments (Courchesne et al., 
1994; Happé, Booth, Charlton, & Hughes, 2006; Hill, 2004; Ozonoff, 1997). 
8.3.  General Limitations 
8.3.1.  Developing new tasks of self-other control.  There are some general 
limitations in the current body of research which are worth outlining here. The aim was to 
develop new tasks to index self-other control across different social domains but with the 
same basic conflict between the self and other, and thus the requirement for online control to 
be exerted over these representations. However, despite self-other interference effects being 
observed in each of the domains considered, there are important differences between the tasks 
which are not controlled for. For example, the imitation-inhibition task requires a speeded 
response, with reaction time constituting the dependent variable, whereas the lie detection 
and social conformity tasks do not require speeded responses and performance accuracy 
makes up the dependent variable of interest. Moreover, the imitation-inhibition task measures 
a form of involuntary or automatic behaviour, whereas other measures of self-other control 
including the Director Task (perspective-taking measure), lie detection and social conformity 
tasks measure a response which may be deliberated over and is a voluntary, planned 
response. It may be that there is an important distinction between the role of self-other control 
and the TPJ in involuntary, speeded measures of social cognition versus voluntary measures 
which is not considered in the current work. These differences between the tasks may explain 
why tDCS to the TPJ in both the lie detection task (in Chapter 5 of this thesis), and the 
perspective-taking task (Hogeveen et al., 2015; Santiesteban et al., 2012a, 2015) shows a 
selective modulation of self-other conflict trials only, whereas the same protocol of 
stimulation has been shown to modulate both self-other conflict and non-conflict trials of the 
imitation-inhibition task (Santiesteban et al., 2012a, 2015). All tasks, however, do measure 
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the relatively unconscious impact of conflict between the representations of the self and 
other(s) on one’s own response and thus the tasks are perhaps sufficiently equivalent at this 
level to be compared. 
 Moreover, an important point to consider when developing new tasks of self-other 
control, is the previous failure to find the modulatory effect of tDCS to the TPJ in two 
independent theory of mind tasks, as well as a lack of association between other self-other 
control tasks and theory of mind (Santiesteban et al., 2012a, 2012b 2015). Theory of mind 
has been reliably found to recruit the right TPJ (Castelli et al., 2000; Saxe, 2009, 2010; Saxe 
& Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe & Wexler, 2005; Scholz, Triantafyllou, Whitfield-Gabrieli, Brown, 
& Saxe, 2009), and does intuitively require the key process of self and other representation of 
mental states, as well as control between these in order for successful theory of mind 
(Spengler et al., 2009a, 2010). However, experimental tasks used to index theory of mind in 
this literature include the Strange Stories task (Happé, 1994) and the Movie for the 
Assessment of Social Cognition (Dziobek et al., 2006) task, both of which do not require 
online representation and control of the self and other during the response period. For 
example, both tasks involve listening to or reading about a social interaction between a set of 
characters after which they are retrospectively asked to reflect on the social situation and 
answer a set of multiple choice comprehension questions about the behaviour of the 
characters. Thus, no response is required at the initial stage during which conflict between the 
mental states of the self and the other(s) occurs, and it may be this initial online conflict 
between self and other during the response period which is crucial for the involvement of the 
TPJ and indeed this mechanism of self-other control. Future studies may look to design a 
theory of mind task which elicits equivalent requirements for representation and control of 
competing self and other representations during the critical response period in order to truly 
test the involvement of self-other control in theory of mind. 
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8.3.2.  Assessing self-other control in disorders of social cognition.  Additionally, 
there are general limitations when considering investigation of disorders of social cognition. 
ASD is a particularly heterogeneous disorder making diagnosis difficult. There are also 
problems with tools used to assess ASD severity in research studies. For example, often 
measures which provide a severity score are utilised, such as the AQ and the Autism 
Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS) as is the case in the current thesis. However, in 
Chapters 2 and 6 as well as in recent assessments of the relationship between AQ / AQ-10 
and ADOS severity scores (Ashwood et al., 2016; Morrier et al., 2017) these have been found 
not to correlate with one another (ps > .2). This may be in part due to the AQ being a self-
report scale, whereas the ADOS is a diagnostic tool completed by a clinician, but this 
presents a problem as to which measures should be deemed most valid for use in research. 
Consequently, the relationship between autistic trait severity and tasks of self-other control in 
the current thesis are not entirely consistent across AQ and ADOS measures. In Chapter 2, 
Experiment 2, a correlation was observed between self-other control in the imitation-
inhibition task and ADOS severity scores but not AQ severity scores; whereas Chapters 6 and 
7 present correlations between self-other control using the lie detection and social conformity 
paradigms with AQ and AQ-10 scores respectively. No correlation was observed in Chapter 6 
with ADOS severity scores. 
These results appear contradictory if the tasks used here do indeed index the same 
underlying mechanism. However, perhaps different elements of an individual’s profile of 
autistic traits are identified and reported by the self, compared to by a clinician, explaining 
why these may not be associated with one another and may be differentially associated to our 
self-other control measures. For example, attributes reported by the individual (via the self-
report AQ) may be less likely to correlate with a performance measure of automatic or 
involuntary behaviour (such as the imitation-inhibition task), whereas clinician-rated 
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attributes of an individual’s profile (via the ADOS) are perhaps more likely to relate to these 
aspects of automatic behaviour which are not apparent to the individual but are visible to a 
clinician. Likewise, the lie detection and social conformity tasks as previously mentioned, 
involve more conscious deliberation and knowledge of one’s own responses and thus may be 
more likely to relate to self-reported than clinician-reported attributes of an individual’s 
autistic profile. 
The co-occurrence between disorders can also present a problem in research due to 
the difficulty in separating out the contribution of one disorder from another on the 
behavioural trait of interest. For example, depression and anxiety regularly co-occur with 
ASD, and a body of work has now demonstrated that the emotional symptoms thought to be a 
core feature of ASD, schizophrenia and eating disorders are in fact accounted for by 
alexithymia as a separate but co-occurring condition (Brewer, Cook, & Bird, 2014; Brewer, 
Cook, Cardi, Treasure, & Bird, 2015; Cook, Brewer, Shah, & Bird, 2013). Thus, it is 
important to consider and measure co-occurring disorders or conditions when investigating 
any neurodevelopmental or neuropsychiatric condition. Chapters 3 and 6 of the current thesis 
indeed included regression analyses which examined the unique contribution of alexithymic 
and autistic traits to performance in two different tasks of self-other control. Future research 
in this area would benefit from a combination of population representative samples but also 
targeted, highly controlled studies to try to investigate disorder-specific impairments and 
those which may be present due to other co-occurring conditions. Additionally, studies 
should include measures of traits commonly associated with neuropsychological conditions 
such as depression, anxiety and self-esteem.  
Finally, it is particularly important to recognise that the mechanism of self-other 
control here does not replace other theories of the social deficits observed in disorders such as 
ASD, but rather may compliment these as an underlying and lower-level mechanism to 
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explain consistency between performance in different social domains and between social 
disorders characterised by similar social impairments. For example, one theory which appears 
now to lack plausibility (Hamilton, 2013) in ASD is the Broken Mirror Theory (Iacoboni & 
Dapretto, 2006; Ramachandran & Oberman, 2006). Other theories regarding the social 
impairments in ASD, which were beyond the scope of the current thesis to investigate, also 
include the Social Motivation Theory (Chevallier, Kohls, Troiani, Brodkin, & Schultz, 2012), 
the Theory of Mind Hypothesis (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985) and the Social 
Attention or Social Orienting Hypothesis (Leekam, 2016; Senju & Johnson, 2009). These 
theories may go a little way to explaining some of the specific problems individuals with 
ASD have in understanding and performing well in social situations. However, the 
mechanism of self-other control may have the capacity to explain why some basic automatic 
social behaviours are intact in these individuals whilst they lack control or modulation of 
their social behaviour across broad social domains. In line with the conceptual shift towards 
viewing ASD as a spectrum disorder, this mechanism allows the consideration of individual 
differences in social cognitive functioning across the spectrum of autistic traits which are 
difficult to account for under other theories which take a categorical view on neuropsychiatric 
disorders.  
Nevertheless, it is important to appreciate that self-other control is just one 
mechanism contributing to the extremely complex pool of processes underlying social 
functioning. Accordingly, along with the multi-factorial nature of clinical disorders, we 
cannot presume a single cause or mechanism to wholly explain atypical social cognitive 
development, and one must also consider the direction of causality here; whether deficient 
self-other control may be a cause or a consequence of neurodevelopmental disorders. 
Finally, an important consideration of the current body of research is that of sample 
sizes. For example, the sample sizes of individuals with ASD used in the current thesis 
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(Chapter 2, Experiment 2 and Chapter 6) are restricted to the number of individuals who had 
consented in previous experiments to be re-contacted and were then available to take part 
during the testing period. However, a notable problem with this form of recruitment is that 
sample size cannot always be determined a priori to enable enough power to detect a 
prespecified effect size (Farrokhyar, Reddy, Poolman, & Bhandari, 2013). A small sample 
size may simply be underpowered to detect a true effect (type II effect), but also, via the 
potential introduction of systematic bias or error may lead to a false positive effect (type I 
error). Therefore, determining the appropriate sample size a priori and recruiting and testing a 
specified number of individuals would help to mitigate these concerns (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, 
& Buchner, 2007).  
8.4.  Outstanding Questions 
 8.3.1.  Applicability to other disorders of social cognition: Schizophrenia.  We 
have seen in the current thesis that the mechanism of self-other control may underlie many 
facets of social functioning, but also that it may be considered a mechanism which is 
impaired in individuals with disorders of social cognition, such as ASD and alexithymia. 
However, it is important to consider how this may extend to other neuropsychiatric disorders. 
One of particular interest is that of schizophrenia. A short outline of the potential for self-
other control in the context of this disorder will now be considered. 
As with ASD, schizophrenia has been associated with various impairments in social 
functioning usually present prior to and persisting after the onset of symptoms (Tandon, 
Keshavan, & Nasrallah, 2008). Behaviourally, individuals with schizophrenia are often 
described as having diminished self-reflection (Ferri et al., 2012; Roe & Davidson, 2005; van 
der Meer, Costafreda, Aleman, & David, 2010), abnormalities in attributing agency to the self 
and others (Graham-Schmidt, Martin-Iverson, & Waters, in press; Renes, Vermeulen, Kahn, 
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Aarts, & van Haren, 2013) and more general impairments in self-other integration and 
distinction, which have been argued to account for the broad social cognitive deficits 
associated with schizophrenia (Langdon et al., 1997; van der Weiden, Prikken, & van Haren, 
2015). Moreover, as with ASD, key aspects of the symptom profile in schizophrenia may be 
explained by a deficit in self-other control. For instance, identity and reality disturbances 
such as hallucinations and thought insertion exemplify a misattribution of self-generated, 
internal representations to others or the external world, highlighting a difficulty in managing 
representations of self and others (Allen, Freeman, Johns, & McGuire, 2006; Allen et al., 
2004; Jeannerod, 2009).  
It is now well established that fronto-temporal functional connectivity is reduced in 
schizophrenia and this has been linked to diminished top-down modulatory control over 
social behaviour (Allen, Larøi, McGuire, & Aleman, 2008; Cook, Barbalat, & Blakemore, 
2012). Abnormal structure and function of the TPJ as a key node within this network has 
been reported in individuals at risk (Brüne et al., 2011), as well as those suffering from 
schizophrenia (Benedetti et al., 2009; Brüne et al., 2008; Das, Lagopoulos, Coulston, 
Henderson, & Malhi, 2012; de Achával et al., 2012; Koeda, Takahashi, Matsuura, Asai, & 
Okubo, 2013; Lee, Quintana, Nori, & Green, 2011), relative to healthy controls. Diminished 
activation of this region has been associated with impaired social cognitive performance, 
particularly in domains such as theory of mind and emotion processing. Moreover, abnormal 
structure of the inferior parietal lobule (Torrey, 2007) and function of the superior temporal 
gyrus (Allen et al., 2004, 2006; Koeda et al., 2013; Mechelli et al., 2007) have been 
associated with social functioning deficits, particularly in judging agency and symptoms such 
as visual and auditory hallucinations. Both the posterior end of the superior temporal gyrus 
and the most inferior aspect of the inferior parietal lobule border the TPJ.  
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Taken together, evidence to date is suggestive of the TPJ’s role in a common 
neurocognitive mechanism which may be deficient across disorders. Here we have 
considered how impairments associated with schizophrenia as well as ASD and alexithymia 
may fit into a framework of atypical self-other control, paving the way for future research in 
this area. Such a mechanism may also aid in our understanding and treatment of the cognitive 
symptoms experienced by individuals with disorders of social cognition. They also raise the 
possibility that cross-disorder cognitive interventions could be designed incorporating 
training in self-other control. 
8.3.3.  The future for the neural basis of self-other control.  There is now a large 
body of evidence to support the involvement of the TPJ in the mechanism of self-other 
control and this indeed appears to be specific to social cognition and not to other more 
general inhibitory processes (Hogeveen et al., 2015; Santiesteban et al., 2012a, 2015; Sowden 
& Catmur, 2015; Sowden et al., 2015). However, it is important to consider the TPJ’s role in 
different functional networks in the brain and indeed the different input and output 
organisation of this region in the context of each of these networks and how they relate to 
social and non-social function (Krall et al., 2015; Mars et al., 2012). Moreover, another 
region suggested to be involved in this process is the mPFC (Brass et al., 2005, 2009; Costa, 
Torriero, Oliveri, & Caltagirone, 2008; Spengler et al., 2009a). The TPJ is purported to be 
particularly important in determining agency (whether the action is performed by the self or 
the other), whereas the mPFC primarily manages and enforces our own motor representations 
and actions as a result (Brass et al., 2005, 2009). Therefore, it seems intuitive that these areas 
form a functional network to fulfil this important function, but further research is required to 
confirm the individual and combined roles of these regions in facilitating self-other control. 
No individual brain region functions in isolation and consequently the use of a combination 
of methods (e.g. neuroimaging and neurostimulation) will help to establish the network 
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within which the TPJ functions, as well as its connectivity with the mPFC. Moreover, this 
will allow the investigation of the consequence of exciting or inhibiting one region on the 
integrity of the whole network as well as behavioural measures of self-other control. 
Additionally, this body of work concerning the neural basis of self-other control via 
neurostimulation to the TPJ is yet to be investigated in clinical populations which is a fruitful 
avenue for future research. Although a short session of neurostimulation has only short-
lasting aftereffects (up to 90 minutes), there is evidence to suggest that repeated sessions at 
intervals of around 24 hours (Reis et al., 2009) and a combination of tDCS and cognitive 
behavioural training may have much longer lasting effects of 2 months or more (Looi & 
Cohen Kadosh, 2016). Such an intervention may pave the way for future understanding and 
application of the mechanism of self-other control to atypical social functioning, and much 
interest and recent success has been seen in the utility of tDCS to treat depression (Nitsche, 
Boggio, Fregni, & Pascual-Leone, 2009; Shiozawa et al., 2014) and some other clinical 
conditions such as stroke, Parkinson’s disease and pain-related conditions (Borckardt et al., 
2011, 2012; Demirtas-Tatlidede, Vahabzadeh-Hagh, & Pascual-Leone, 2013; Fregni et al., 
2006; Lindenberg, Renga, Zhu, Nair, & Schlaug, 2010). This work is yet to be extended to 
the enhancement of social cognitive function. 
Finally, it will also be important to consider other suggested roles for TPJ in social 
cognition. For example, another competing idea is that the mPFC and TPJ, rather than 
facilitating the control of competing representations of self and other, may in fact help to 
differentiate task-relevant from task-irrelevant representations (Cook, 2014; Nicolle et al., 
2012). In the context of the imitation-inhibition task, this relates to identifying which of the 
representations is most relevant to task performance – the motor representation pertaining to 
the other or that of the required response of the self. There may be an interesting avenue for 
teasing apart these two dimensions in the future, however, at present it remains unclear how a 
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mechanism of task-relevance differentiation may extend to the range of social cognitive 
abilities investigated to date in the self-other control literature. 
 8.3.5.  Development and distinctions in self-other control.  Finally, an area not 
touched upon in the current body of work, but which is particularly important for future 
investigation is the emergence of self-other control during development (Steinbeis, 2016). 
This will not only aid our understanding of typical and atypical social cognitive development, 
but will also provide a better understanding of how to target interventions towards training 
self-other control in individuals experiencing atypical social cognitive functioning.  
Moreover, by studying the emergence of self-other control during early development, 
potential distinctions between self-other control in the motor, cognitive and affective domains 
may be established (Lamm, Bukowski, & Silani, 2015). For example, we know that imitative 
behaviour has the capacity to emerge very early in development (see Cook, Bird, Catmur, 
Press, & Heyes, 2014 for a review of the emergence of imitative behaviour), whereas 
processing emotions and mental states of the self and others requires additional high-level 
abilities and thus require more time to develop (Bischof-Kohler, 1994; Wellman, Cross, & 
Watson, 2001). In fact, Steinbeis (2016) in his review of the current literature proposes that 
self-other control of cognitive and emotional states is already dissociable in early childhood. 
Moreover, although the TPJ appears to serve an underlying, common process involved in 
various social domains, there is reason to believe that posterior and anterior regions of the 
TPJ may also be selective to cognitive and affective domains (Mars et al., 2012; Steinbeis, 
2016). 
8.6.  Conclusion 
The studies from the current thesis give an insight into the role of the neurocognitive 
mechanism of self-other control in typical and atypical social cognition. That is how the 
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ability to maintain neural representations of the self and others, whether these are pertaining 
to motor, visual perspective, affective state, or opinion representations, as well as the ability 
to inhibit or enhance these representations according to the demands of the situation, impact 
on social cognitive functioning. The current body of work develops past research in this area 
by demonstrating that self-other control is indeed relevant to overcoming conflict between 
self and other representations, from low to high level social domains; from imitation to lie 
detection and social conformity. Novel tasks were successfully developed in this work for use 
in future studies (Chapters 5 and 7).  
Moreover, the first investigations of self-other control in disorders of social cognition 
were completed, specifically with respect to ASD (Chapters 2, 6 and 7) and alexithymia 
(Chapter 3). These chapters revealed relationships between individual difference measures of 
autistic and alexithymic trait severities and the integrity of self-other control. However, 
interesting observations can be made of the common and dissociable role for this mechanism 
in the social cognitive impairments experienced across the spectrum of the two conditions 
considered. The current thesis adds to the current literature regarding the role of the TPJ in 
this mechanism, whilst demonstrating that its involvement extends to higher level social 
domains more similar to everyday social encounters and concerning the opinions of the self 
and other. 
Taken together, whether impairments in TPJ function and self-other control integrity 
are acquired or developmental in origin, which is an important future direction for this 
research, self-other control emerges as a neurocognitive mechanism capable of explaining 
both typical and atypical social cognitive functioning. By highlighting a mechanism with the 
potential to explain many facets of the broad profile of social impairments in autism, as well 
as other disorders with similar social symptom profiles, researchers may be better equipped to 
203 
advise on neurocognitive markers and possible interventions for common disorders of social 
cognition.  
It is important to keep in mind that we cannot presume a single cause or mechanism 
for the complexities of human social cognition. Nevertheless, investigation of such a low-
level mechanism in future research is warranted. In particular, the exploration of the 
developmental origins of self-other control and how this may account for different 
developmental trajectories across social cognitive abilities will greatly advance our 
understanding of this mechanism. Finally, appreciating that no area of the brain works in 
isolation to support a particular cognitive function, it is also important for research to 
establish the neural network (centring most likely on the TPJ and mPFC) which governs this 
unique and vital ability to control competing representations of the self and other. 
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Appendix A: Opinion Questionnaire 
 
Please answer the following questions as honestly as you are able. You are asked to give your 
personal stance on the topic presented. The scale goes from 1 - 6 with 1 indicating that you are 
"Strongly for" the topic and 6 indicating that you are "Strongly against" the topic. 
 
1. Medical Abortion    Strongly for                      Strongly against 
                  1    2    3    4    5    6 
2. Euthanasia    Strongly for                      Strongly against 
                  1    2    3    4    5    6 
3. Horoscopes    Strongly for                      Strongly against 
                  1    2    3    4    5    6 
4. The idea of Climate Change    Strongly for                      Strongly against 
                  1    2    3    4    5    6 
5. Gay marriage    Strongly for                      Strongly against 
                  1    2    3    4    5    6 
6. Genetically Modified Foodstuffs    Strongly for                      Strongly against 
                  1    2    3    4    5    6 
7. Unemployment benefits    Strongly for                      Strongly against 
                  1    2    3    4    5    6 
8. Animal Testing    Strongly for                      Strongly against 
                  1    2    3    4    5    6 
9. Nuclear power    Strongly for                      Strongly against 
                  1    2    3    4    5    6 
10. Pornography    Strongly for                      Strongly against 
                  1    2    3    4    5    6 
11. Homeopathic medicine    Strongly for                      Strongly against 
                  1    2    3    4    5    6 
12. Lying    Strongly for                      Strongly against 
                  1    2    3    4    5    6 
13. Free University    Strongly for                      Strongly against 
                  1    2    3    4    5    6 
14. School Uniform    Strongly for                      Strongly against 
                  1    2    3    4    5    6 
15. Stem Cell research    Strongly for                      Strongly against 
                  1    2    3    4    5    6 
16. The Monarchy    Strongly for                      Strongly against 
                  1    2    3    4    5    6 
17. Television    Strongly for                      Strongly against 
                  1    2    3    4    5    6 
18. Alcohol    Strongly for                      Strongly against 
                  1    2    3    4    5    6 
19. Cosmetic / Plastic Surgery    Strongly for                      Strongly against 
                  1    2    3    4    5    6 
20. Videogames    Strongly for                      Strongly against 
                  1    2    3    4    5    6 
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Appendix B: Autism Spectrum Quotient 
 
Read each statement and tick the box to the right of the 
statement that corresponds best to your answer. There are 
no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time 















1. I prefer to do things with others rather than on my own.     
2. I prefer to do things the same way over and over again.     
3. If I try to imagine something I find it very easy to create a 
picture in my mind. 
    
4. I frequently get so absorbed in one thing that I lose sight of 
other things. 
    
5. I often notice small sounds when others do not.     
6. I usually notice car number plates or similar strings of 
information. 
    
7. Other people frequently tell me that what I’ve said is 
impolite, even though I think it is polite. 
    
8. When I’m reading a story, I can easily imagine what the 
characters might look like. 
    
9. I am fascinated by dates.     
10. In a social group, I can easily keep track of several  
different people’s conversations. 
    
11. I find social situations easy.     
12. I tend to notice details that others do not.     
13. I would rather go to a library than a party.     
14. I find making up stories easy.     
15. I find myself drawn more strongly to people than to things.     
16. I tend to have very strong interests, which I get upset about 
if I can’t pursue. 
    
17. I enjoy social chit-chat.     
18. When I talk, it isn’t always easy for others to get a word in 
edgeways. 
    
19. I am fascinated by numbers.     
20. When I’m reading a story, I find it difficult to work out the 
characters’ intentions. 
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21. I don’t particularly enjoy reading fiction.     
22. I find it hard to make new friends.     
23. I notice patterns in things all the time.     
24. I would rather go to the theatre than to a museum.     
25. It does not upset me if my daily routine is disturbed.     
26. I frequently find that I don’t know how to keep a 
conversation going. 
    
27. I find it easy to « read between the lines » when someone 
is talking to me. 
    
28. I usually concentrate more on the whole picture rather than 
the small details. 
    
29. I’m not very good at remembering phone numbers.     
30. I don’t usually notice small changes in a situation, or a 
person’s appearance. 
    
31. I know how to tell if someone listening to me is getting 
bored. 
    
32. I find it easy to do more than one thing at once.     
33. When I talk on the phone, I’m not sure when its my turn to 
speak. 
    
34. I enjoy doing things spontaneously.     
35. I am often the last to understand the point of a joke.     
36. I find it easy to work out what someone is thinking or 
feeling just by looking at their face. 
    
37. If there is an interruption, I can switch back to what I was 
doing very quickly. 
    
38. I am good at social chit-chat.     
39. People often tell me that I keep going on and on about the 
same thing. 
    
40. When I was young, I used to enjoy playing games 
involving pretending with other children. 
    
41. I like to collect information about categories of things (e.g. 
types of car, types of bird, types of train, types of plant 
etc) 
    
42. I find it difficult to imagine what it would be like to be 
someone else. 
    
43. I like to plan any activities I participate in carefully.     
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44. I enjoy social occasions.     
45. I find it difficult to work out people’s intentions.     
46. New situations make me anxious.     
47. I enjoy meeting new people.     
48. I am a good diplomat.     
49. I am not very good at remembering people’s date of birth.     
50. I find it very easy to play games with children that involve 
pretending. 




Appendix C: Toronto Alexithymia Scale 
 
Indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. Use the middle 
answer ('I neither agree or disagree') only if you are really unable to assess your behaviour. 
When you have finished, please inform the experimenter. 
 
1. I am often confused about what emotion I 
am feeling 
 Strongly Disagree                Strongly Agree 
                          1    2    3    4    5   
2. It is difficult for me to find the right words 
for my feelings 
Strongly Disagree                Strongly Agree 
                          1    2    3    4    5   
3. I have physical sensations that even 
doctors don’t understand   
Strongly Disagree                Strongly Agree 
                          1    2    3    4    5   
4. I am able to describe my feelings easily Strongly Disagree                Strongly Agree 
                          1    2    3    4    5   
5. I prefer to analyze problems rather than 
just describe them 
Strongly Disagree                Strongly Agree 
                          1    2    3    4    5   
6. When I am upset, I don’t know if I am sad, 
frightened, or angry 
Strongly Disagree                Strongly Agree 
                          1    2    3    4    5   
7. I am often puzzled by sensations in my 
body 
Strongly Disagree                Strongly Agree 
                          1    2    3    4    5   
8. I prefer to just let things happen rather than 
to understand why they turned out that way 
Strongly Disagree                Strongly Agree 
                          1    2    3    4    5   
9. I have feelings that I can’t quite identify Strongly Disagree                Strongly Agree 
                          1    2    3    4    5   
10. Being in touch with emotions is essential   Strongly Disagree                Strongly Agree 
                          1    2    3    4    5   
11. I find it hard to describe how I feel about 
people 
Strongly Disagree                Strongly Agree 
                          1    2    3    4    5   
12. People tell me to describe my feelings 
more 
Strongly Disagree                Strongly Agree 
                          1    2    3    4    5   
13. I often don’t know what’s going on inside 
me 
Strongly Disagree                Strongly Agree 
                          1    2    3    4    5   
14. I often don’t know why I am angry Strongly Disagree                Strongly Agree 
                          1    2    3    4    5   
15. I prefer talking to people about their daily 
activities rather than their feelings 
Strongly Disagree                Strongly Agree 
                          1    2    3    4    5   
16. I prefer to watch light entertainments 
shows rather than psychological dramas 
Strongly Disagree                Strongly Agree 
                          1    2    3    4    5   
17. It is difficult for me to reveal my innermost 
feelings, even to close friends 
Strongly Disagree                Strongly Agree 
                          1    2    3    4    5   
18. I can feel close to someone, even in 
moments of silence 
Strongly Disagree                Strongly Agree 
                          1    2    3    4    5   
19. I find examination of my feelings useful in 
solving personal problems 
Strongly Disagree                Strongly Agree 
                          1    2    3    4    5   
20. Looking for hidden meanings in movies or 
plays distracts from their enjoyment 
Strongly Disagree                Strongly Agree 
                          1    2    3    4    5   
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Appendix D: Autism Spectrum Quotient (10 item scale) 
 
Read each statement and tick the box to the right of the 
statement that corresponds best to your answer. There are 
no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time 















1. I often notice small sounds when others do not     
2. I usually concentrate more on the whole picture, rather 
than the small details 
    
3. I find it easy to do more than one thing at once     
4. If there is an interruption, I can switch back to what I was 
doing very quickly 
    
5. I find it easy to ‘read between the lines’ when someone is 
talking to me 
    
6. I know how to tell if someone listening to me is getting 
bored 
    
7. When I’m reading a story I find it difficult to work out the 
characters’ intentions 
    
8. I like to collect information about categories of things 
(e.g. types of car, types of bird, types of train, types of 
plant etc.) 
    
9. I find it easy to work out what someone is thinking or 
feeling just by looking at their face 
    
10. I find it difficult to work out people’s intentions     
 
SCORING: Only 1 point can be scored for each question. Score 1 point for Definitely or Slightly Agree 
on each of items 1, 7, 8, and 10. Score 1 point for Definitely or Slightly Disagree on each of items 2, 3, 4, 
5, 6, and 9. If the individual scores more than 6 out of 10, consider referring them for a specialist 
diagnostic assessment. 
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